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Speech-tort cases—those in which tort liability attaches based on the
expressive elements of speech—are an unwieldy amalgam of two diver-
gent legal contexts: the public law context of First Amendment law and
the private law context of tort law. Yet the Supreme Court has largely
conceptualized such cases as, in essence, no different from any other
run-of-the-mill First Amendment case. The Court’s decision in Snyder
v. Phelps—its most recent foray into speech torts—highlights its contin-
ued adherence to a highly First Amendment-inflected approach to doc-
trine-building in this area, one that favors broad, categorical rules over
more complex, open-ended, and flexible approaches.
This Article argues that the Court’s approach evinces a broad failure to
recognize the idiosyncratic nature of the speech-tort context. Specifi-
cally, the Court has broadly presumed that the risk of impermissible
chilling effects and the potential for government abuse—the fundamen-
tal reasons for extending First Amendment protections to tort law—are
effectively identical in the speech-tort context as compared to traditional
First Amendment cases dealing with direct government regulation. This
error has led the Court to adopt a blunt, excessively prophylactic ap-
proach to speech-tort cases that threatens to overprotect speech interests
at the expense of tort interests.
Just as light is both particle and wave, speech-tort cases are both public
law and private law; both regulatory and compensatory in nature; and
the product of both state action and private initiative. This unique con-
text should temper the broad assumptions that courts typically take in
analyzing traditional First Amendment cases. While the operation of
tort law can chill protected speech, these chilling effects straddle the line
between the constitutionally permissible chilling effects produced by
private action and the constitutionally problematic chilling effects pro-
duced by direct state regulation. And any concern with potential gov-
ernment abuse is similarly muted in most speech-tort contexts, since the
judicial resolution of private tort suits generally represents a much more
indirect and attenuated form of state action than direct regulation.
The Article therefore argues for a more pragmatic, open-ended, and
contextualized approach to speech-tort cases, with an incrementally
greater tolerance for more tailored, balancing-oriented tests—the sort of
approach that the Court has generally avoided in evaluating content-
based restrictions on speech. If the risks of impermissible chilling effects
and government abuse are comparatively muted in the speech-tort con-
text, then the Court should be comparatively more comfortable in un-
dertaking more modest, contextualized approaches—approaches that
would be particularly valuable within this highly eclectic and complex
body of doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
Ever since its seminal decision in New York Times v. Sullivan,1 the
Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the First Amendment
imposes limitations on how states design their tort law. And this rec-
ognition extends beyond the defamation context: The Court has ar-
ticulated First Amendment boundaries in cases dealing with privacy2
and intentional infliction of emotional distress,3 while lower courts
have recognized First Amendment limitations in areas of tort law such
as negligence,4 intentional interference with contract and prospective
economic relations,5 right of publicity,6 and products liability.7 In all
of these contexts, the courts’ recognition of First Amendment bounda-
ries was rooted in the fact that tort liability was premised on the ex-
pressive elements of speech as opposed to non-speech conduct.
Speech-tort jurisprudence—as I refer to this body of doctrine—is,
at its root, an amalgam of diametrically opposed theoretical and prac-
tical considerations. On a theoretical level, both tort law and the First
Amendment’s protection of free speech are undergirded by an inde-
terminate mix of various theoretical justifications, both deontological
and instrumental in nature. In a given speech-tort case, the varied jus-
tifications on each side of the equation come into direct conflict, effec-
tively forcing courts to choose which set of principles and interests
should prevail over the other.
And on a practical level, speech-tort jurisprudence represents a col-
lision of widely divergent cultures and approaches. The paradigmatic
First Amendment case involves the government’s direct imposition of
some sort of sanction, usually based on a discrete regulatory standard
and involving direct litigation between government and individual. By
contrast, tort law is usually the product of common law development
rather than direct legislative action. Furthermore, tort suits are initi-
ated by private parties, and the government is not usually a party in
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387–88 (1967).
3. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458–59 (2011); Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56, 58
(1988).
4. See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1024 (5th Cir. 1987); McCollum
v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 196–98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Olivia N. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 178
Cal. Rptr. 888, 890–93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
5. See, e.g., Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Inv’r’s Servs., 175 F.3d 848, 856–58
(10th Cir. 1999); Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1058 (9th Cir. 1990).
6. See, e.g., Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 477–79 (Cal. 2003).
7. See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1034–36 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting a
claim that strict products liability applies to erroneous information found in “The Encyclopedia
of Mushrooms”).
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the suit; state action therefore comes only in the form of the court’s
application of state rules of law.
But the Supreme Court’s speech-tort decisions, including its most
recent decision in Snyder v. Phelps, indicate that the Court has largely
conceptualized speech-tort cases as, in essence, no different than any
other run-of-the-mill First Amendment case. Snyder appeared to build
upon and extend the highly First Amendment-inflected approach to
doctrine-building that the Court had undertaken starting in Sullivan: a
preference for broad, categorical rules that value simplicity, relative
administrability, and predictability over complexity, open-endedness,
and flexible tailoring.
In this Article, I argue that this approach evinces a broad failure to
fully appreciate the idiosyncratic nature of the speech-tort context as
compared to cases dealing with direct speech regulations. Specifically,
the Court has broadly presumed that the risk of impermissible chilling
effects and the potential for government abuse—the fundamental rea-
sons for extending First Amendment protection to tort liability—are
effectively identical in the speech-tort context as compared to the di-
rect-regulation context. This error, in turn, has caused the Court to
adopt a highly blunt, excessively prophylactic approach to speech-tort
cases that threatens to overprotect speech interests at the expense of
tort interests.
This broad parallelism between speech-tort cases and cases dealing
with direct government regulation is misguided. Just as light is both
particle and wave, speech-tort jurisprudence is both public law and
private law; both regulatory and compensatory in nature; and the
product of both state action and private initiative. This unique context
should temper the broad assumptions that courts typically take in ana-
lyzing traditional First Amendment cases. While the operation of tort
law can certainly operate to chill protected speech, these chilling ef-
fects straddle the line between the sorts of constitutionally permissible
chilling effects produced by private action and the constitutionally
problematic chilling effects produced by direct state regulation. And
any concern with the potential for government abuse is similarly
muted in most speech-tort contexts, since the judicial resolution of pri-
vate tort suits generally represents a much more indirect and attenu-
ated form of state action than direct regulation.
I therefore argue that the Court should approach speech-tort cases
in a more pragmatic, open-ended, and contextualized manner, with an
incrementally greater tolerance for more tailored, balancing-oriented
approaches—the sorts of approaches that the Court has generally
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avoided in evaluating content-based restrictions on speech.8 If the
risks of impermissible chilling effects and government abuse are com-
paratively muted in the speech-tort context, then the Court should be
comparatively more comfortable in undertaking more modest, contex-
tualized approaches in such cases.
These sorts of approaches are particularly valuable within this body
of doctrine, given the unique nature and complexity of speech-tort
cases. Speech-tort cases cover a wide variety of distinct doctrinal, fac-
tual, and theoretical contexts. If the core constitutional concern un-
derlying such cases is the fear of government abuse through the
manipulation or restriction of public discourse, it is decidedly difficult
to distill this concern into a categorical, easy-to-apply, one- or two-
factor inquiry. A wide range of factors—such as the nature of the tort
claim in question, the type of speech in question, the extent of govern-
ment involvement in the litigation, and any particularized indicia of
animus on the part of the judge or jury—influence this determination,
and the degree of First Amendment concern from case to case can
vary widely. As such, more contextualized and open-ended analyses—
rather than the blunt, skeleton-key solutions that are generally fa-
vored in traditional First Amendment contexts—are particularly
suited for the speech-tort context, and the unique posture of such
cases provides the Court with greater flexibility to adopt them.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I walk through the idio-
syncratic qualities of speech-tort jurisprudence, which represents the
collision of two radically different legal cultures. In Part II, I discuss
the problems with the Court’s current approach to speech-tort cases,
which are ultimately rooted in its broad failure to recognize the
unique posture and complexities presented by indirect regulation of
speech via private tort actions as opposed to direct state regulation of
speech. Finally, in Part III, I argue that the Court should adopt more
contextualized and open-ended approaches in speech-tort cases,
which—although problematic in run-of-the-mill speech cases—are
well suited to the unique posture of speech-tort cases.
I. THE INHERENTLY CONFLICTED NATURE OF
SPEECH-TORT JURISPRUDENCE
At its essence, speech-tort jurisprudence9 represents the collision of
two diametrically opposed legal contexts: the public law context of
8. See infra Part III.
9. I am here using the same definition of this term that I have used in previous work: It refers
to “all circumstances in which tort law extends liability to speech as opposed to non-speech
conduct; specifically, . . . situations in which tort liability attaches based on the expressive ele-
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First Amendment jurisprudence and the private law context of tort
law. Tort law, of course, is traditionally the product of state common
law, “and states generally have free rein to identify social wrongs and
regulate conduct however they please.”10 But starting with New York
Times v. Sullivan,11 the Supreme Court has made clear that to the
extent tort liability rests on the expressive elements of speech, the
First Amendment requires that state tort law be crafted in a manner
that does not infringe on this constitutional right. This clash plays out
on the levels of both theory and practice, and in this Part, I walk
through the various oppositions that create the broad tension that un-
derlies the entirety of speech-tort doctrine.
A. The Intersection Between Tort Law and Freedom of Speech
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Sullivan, any tensions be-
tween tort law and the freedom of speech were navigated internally
through the development of state tort law.12 The highly permissive
standards governing common law defamation claims,13 for example,
were tempered by doctrines such as the fair comment privilege14 and
the fair report privilege,15 which were designed to provide special pro-
tection to speakers in contexts where the deleterious effects of tort
liability on free speech principles would be most acute.16 So at the
time of Sullivan, the underlying tension between tort law and the free-
ments of speech rather than, for instance, its volume or physical form.” David S. Han, Rethinking
Speech Tort Remedies, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1142 (2014).
10. Id.
11. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
12. See, e.g., William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 422 (1960) (describing the
“jealous safeguards thrown about the freedom of speech and of the press,” developed “as a
result of some centuries of conflict,” within common law defamation doctrine).
13. See infra Section III.A.1.
14. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 606 (1938) (delineating the conditions under which
“[c]riticism of so much of another’s activities as are matters of public concern . . . is privileged”).
15. See id. § 611 (describing a conditional privilege for “[t]he publication of a report of judicial
proceedings, or proceedings of a legislative or administrative body or an executive officer of the
United States, a State or Territory thereof, or a municipal corporation or of a body empowered
by law to perform a public duty”).
16. See id. § 606 cmt. c (observing, with respect to the fair comment privilege, that “[i]f the
public is to be aided in forming its judgment upon matters of public interest by a free in-
terchange of opinion, it is essential that honest criticism and comment, no matter how foolish or
prejudiced, be privileged”); Sciandra v. Lynett, 187 A.2d 586, 600 (Pa. 1963) (“Upon the theory
that it is in the public interest that information be made available as to what takes place in public
affairs, a newspaper has the privilege to report the acts of the executive or administrative offi-
cials of government.”); Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward White, The Puzzle of the Dignitary
Torts, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 317, 362 (2019) (observing that “the common law of defamation
had developed privileges, such as fair comment on matters of public concern and the fair and
accurate reporting of official proceedings, which were designed to prevent actions in slander and
libel from unduly restricting the freedoms of speech and the press”).
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dom of speech was not a novel issue—it had long been recognized,
debated, and accommodated in various ways by common law courts.17
Sullivan, however, inaugurated the Supreme Court’s constitutional
foray into the realm of speech-tort jurisprudence. In that case, which
was decided during the height of the civil rights movement in 1964,
Sullivan—the police commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama—sued
the New York Times for libel based on the Times’ publication of a full-
page advertisement entitled “Heed Their Rising Voices.”18 The ad de-
scribed the persecution of civil rights protestors throughout the South,
including Martin Luther King, Jr., as part of an appeal for financial
contributions to aid the civil rights movement.19
Although there were some clear factual inaccuracies in the ad,
many of these inaccuracies were relatively minor in nature.20 Further-
more, the ad never referred to Sullivan by name or position; it merely
described actions allegedly taken by the Montgomery police in re-
sponse to a number of student protests and criticized, in broad terms,
the campaign of “intimidation and violence” against Martin Luther
King, Jr. undertaken by “Southern violators.”21 But the Alabama
courts—applying the state’s highly permissive libel standards in a
highly permissive manner—awarded $500,000 in damages against the
newspaper.22
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Alabama’s application of
its libel law violated the First Amendment.23 And in holding, for the
first time, that the First Amendment sets limitations on how states
may design their tort law, the Court emphasized two primary dangers
to free speech that may arise in the speech-tort context. First, it high-
lighted the chilling effects on protected speech that could arise from
the application of tort law, famously observing “[t]hat erroneous
statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if
17. See, e.g., James Maxwell Koffer, The Pre-Sullivan Common Law Web of Protection
Against Political Defamation Suits, 47 HOFSTRA L. REV. 153, 196–207 (2018) (describing pre-
Sullivan debates regarding the fair comment privilege); Jeffrey Steven Gordon, Silencing State
Courts, 27 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 24–27 (2018) (describing pre-Sullivan debate as to
“whether a member of the public was conditionally privileged to make false and defamatory
statements of fact about public officers and candidates for office”).
18. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256–57 (1964).
19. Id. at 256–58.
20. For example, the demonstrating students “sang the National Anthem and not ‘My Coun-
try, ‘Tis of Thee’”; the police did not “ring” the Alabama State College campus as alleged,
although they “were deployed . . . in large numbers”; and “Dr. King had not been arrested seven
times, but only four.” Id. at 258–59.
21. Id. at 257–58.
22. Id. at 256, 262–64.
23. Id. at 292.
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the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they
need to survive.”24 Later on, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, the Court
stated that “[a]lthough the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy
of constitutional protection,” sanctioning such speech “may lead to
intolerable self-censorship,” such that “[t]he First Amendment re-
quires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that
matters.”25
Second, the Court emphasized the risk of government abuse associ-
ated with allowing these sorts of libel judgments against public offi-
cials. The Court drew a direct comparison between the case at hand
and the Sedition Act of 1798, which criminalized defamation against
the government and, as the Court noted, has since been broadly pre-
sumed to be unconstitutional.26 As the Court observed, “What a State
may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is
likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel.”27 In other words,
just as the government cannot seek to silence its critics by direct crimi-
nal prosecution, it cannot do so by upholding large liability judgments
in defamation cases against public officials. To hold otherwise would
be tantamount to resurrecting seditious libel, raising “the possibility
that a good-faith critic of government will be penalized for his
criticism.”28
Linked together, these two concerns—the fear of chilling effects on
protected speech and the fear of government abuse—represent the
core rationale for establishing First Amendment boundaries to tort
law. And Sullivan, in many ways, represented a perfect storm of these
concerns at their very apex.29 The case involved a particularly heated
and polarizing issue of public concern. Given the damages awarded,
the chilling effects were clear: $500,000 was a substantial sum of
money (even to the New York Times), and paying out such a judg-
ment would likely sway them (and others) from ever criticizing official
actions in Alabama. And given the plaintiff’s status as a public offi-
cial—combined with the Alabama courts’ generous application of
state tort law that allowed him to recover regarding statements that
never directly identified him30—the high risk of government abuse
24. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271–72.
25. 418 U.S. 323, 340–41 (1974).
26. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273–77 (1964).
27. Id. at 277.
28. Id. at 277–78, 292.
29. See Nathan B. Oman & Jason M. Solomon, The Supreme Court’s Theory of Private Law,
62 DUKE L.J. 1109, 1112 (2013) (observing that “Sullivan was a uniquely appropriate vehicle” for
applying the First Amendment to a state common-law tort action).
30. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 288–92.
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was apparent, with relatively little to distinguish the case at hand from
seditious libel. One could conceptualize the case as, in effect, a suit
brought directly by the government against a private party for state-
ments critical of official actions.31
In later cases, the Court extended constitutional protection beyond
cases involving public officials. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,32 a
splintered majority extended the Sullivan standard to libel claims
raised by public figures,33 and in Gertz, the Court extended lesser con-
stitutional protections to libel claims raised by private figures.34 In
these contexts, no direct analogies to seditious libel could be drawn,35
and the Court’s rhetoric focused on the risk of undue chilling effects
on public discourse rather than the risk of government abuse.36
But despite this rhetorical shift, these two concerns remain funda-
mentally intertwined. Of course, chilling effects on protected speech
raise First Amendment concerns only when they are produced by
state action (rather than purely private action).37 And although Sulli-
van itself involved a tort claim brought by a public official, the Sulli-
van Court broadly held that a court’s mere application of state rules of
law represents state action triggering First Amendment protections.38
So the Court has, in effect, adopted an incredibly expansive concep-
tion of constitutionally problematic government abuse (and, in turn,
31. See id. at 291–92 (“For good reason, no court of last resort in this country has ever held, or
even suggested, that prosecutions for libel on government have any place in the American sys-
tem of jurisprudence. The present proposition would sidestep this obstacle by transmuting criti-
cism of government, however impersonal it may seem on its face, into personal criticism, and
hence potential libel, of the officials of whom the government is composed.” (citation omitted)).
32. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
33. Although Justice John Marshall Harlan’s plurality opinion adopted a less stringent consti-
tutional standard in the public figure context, five Justices agreed with Chief Justice Earl War-
ren’s extension of the Sullivan rule to public figures as set forth in his concurring opinion. See id.
at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 170 (Black, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 172 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 336 (1974).
34. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
35. See Butts, 388 U.S. at 154 (plurality opinion) (observing that “[t]hese actions cannot be
analogized to prosecutions for seditious libel”); id. at 163 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (“To me, differentiation between ‘public figures’ and ‘public officials’ and adoption of
separate standards of proof for each have no basis in law, logic, or First Amendment policy.”).
36. See id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“Our citizenry has a legitimate
and substantial interest in the conduct of [public figures], and freedom of the press to engage in
uninhibited debate about their involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as it is in the
case of ‘public officials.’”); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (“Our decisions recognize that a rule of strict
liability that compels a publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual asser-
tions may lead to intolerable self-censorship.”).
37. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991) (observing that “the First
Amendment has no bearing” on a case absent state action).
38. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
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an incredibly expansive conception of constitutionally problematic
chilling effects)—one that encompasses a broad range of private tort
actions39 in which the government plays a far less direct role than it
did in Sullivan.40
B. Theoretical Conflicts41
When, as in Sullivan, First Amendment considerations are intro-
duced into the realm of tort law, a number of theoretical, practical,
and cultural oppositions emerge. On the theoretical side, speech-tort
cases represent a fundamental conflict between two distinct sets of
interests. On the one hand, they implicate the foundational rationales
underlying the First Amendment’s protection of speech—the various
reasons why speech is deemed special such that it is entitled to greater
protection than non-speech conduct. On the other hand, they impli-
cate society’s interests in imposing tort liability. Conceptually speak-
ing, speech-tort jurisprudence represents courts’ attempt to craft the
appropriate balance between these two opposing sets of interests.
Let’s look first at the speech side of the equation. Although the
Supreme Court has never adopted a single, unified theory of free ex-
pression,42 four particular rationales have tended to dominate both
the academic and judicial discourse. The first is the idea that unfet-
tered speech has special value as a means of uncovering truth,43 an
39. This might rest on an expansive view of who effectively constitutes the “government” in a
private tort action. See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (“‘[P]ublic figures,’
like ‘public officials,’ often play an influential role in ordering society. And surely as a class these
‘public figures’ have as ready access as ‘public officials’ to mass media of communication, both to
influence policy and to counter criticism of their views and activities.”). Or it might rest on
suspicions regarding judges and juries in resolving the tort claim in question. See Hustler v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (highlighting the risk that a jury in an IIED case would “impose
liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a
particular expression”).
40. As I argue below, this lack of nuance in distinguishing between the high potential for
government abuse in a case like Sullivan as compared to more run-of-the-mill speech-tort cases
like Snyder v. Phelps represents a central problem in the Court’s current approach to speech-tort
cases. See infra Section II.B.
41. My discussion in this Section draws from my previous work. See Han, supra note 9, at
1144–47.
42. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 591 (1982)
(“There seems to be general agreement that the Supreme Court has failed in its attempts to
devise a coherent theory of free expression.”); Steven Shiffrin, Dissent, Democratic Participation,
and First Amendment Methodology, 97 VA. L. REV. 559, 560 (2011) (“No theory has dominated
the Court’s complex accommodations.”).
43. Probably the most notable expositor of this theory was John Stuart Mill. See JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY 87 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859)
(arguing that the free exchange of ideas provides society with “the opportunity of exchanging
error for truth”).
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idea famously encapsulated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s state-
ment that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market.”44 The second is the
idea that unfettered speech is necessary for democratic self-govern-
ance; if the citizens in a democracy are the ultimate sovereigns, they
must have the freedom to openly debate and discuss matters of public
concern to govern themselves effectively.45
Apart from these instrumental justifications, a third rationale for
protecting speech is deontological in nature: the idea that free speech
is an essential aspect of individual autonomy and personhood, and
thus represents a good in itself.46 Under this view, “[o]ur ability to
deliberate, to reach conclusions about our good, and to act on those
conclusions is the foundation of our status as free and rational per-
sons.”47 And a final theoretical rationale for protecting speech is to
check government abuse in managing public discourse.48 That is, the
reason to protect speech might have less to do with the value pro-
duced by such speech and more to do with the significant harm poten-
tially caused by government intervention in the marketplace of
ideas.49
On the other side of the equation, speech-tort cases also implicate
society’s interests in imposing tort liability. The imposition of tort law
might be premised on corrective justice principles—the “simple and
elegant” idea that “when one person has been wrongfully injured by
another, the injurer must make the injured party whole.”50 Similarly,
44. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
45. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERN-
MENT 16–17 (1948); id. at 26 (observing that for democratic self-governance to function effec-
tively, “unwise ideas must have a hearing as well as wise ones, unfair as well as fair, dangerous as
well as safe, un-American as well as American”).
46. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 877, 879 (1963).
47. Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 225, 233 (1992).
48. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive
in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996) (arguing that “First Amend-
ment . . . law has as its primary, though unstated, object the discovery of improper governmental
motives”); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521, 529.
49. See Frederick Schauer, The Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74 CALIF. L.
REV. 761, 782 (1986) (describing “negative” theories of free speech that “stress[ ] the harmful
consequences of regulating speech rather than its intrinsic value”).
50. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 695 (2003).
Under this view, tort law represents “a mechanism through which defendants who have wrong-
fully injured plaintiffs are required to compensate those plaintiffs for their injuries, and thereby
make them whole insofar as this is practically possible.” Id. See generally JULES COLEMAN, RISKS
AND WRONGS (1992); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-2\DPL212.txt unknown Seq: 12 21-APR-20 12:04
506 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:495
tort law might be premised on a concept of civil recourse—“the prin-
ciple that plaintiffs who have been wronged are entitled to some ave-
nue of civil recourse against the tortfeasor who wronged them.”51
Tort liability can also be imposed for purely instrumental pur-
poses.52 It may be used as a means of incentivizing actors to behave in
socially optimal ways—by, for example, encouraging them to take
precautions against accidents when they can do so more efficiently
than others; deterring them from acting when those actions are exces-
sively risky; or allocating liability to those actors most capable of dis-
tributing such losses amongst others.53 Under this view, tort law is a
mechanism for state regulation—a way for the state to shape behavior
to meet certain social goals, such as minimizing the costs associated
with accidents.
There is no academic or judicial consensus as to what singular set of
theoretical rationales drives (or ought to drive) First Amendment law
or tort law.54 On both sides, different courts, in different contexts,
have been driven by both moral and instrumental considerations in
crafting doctrine. As such, every speech-tort case can best be concep-
tualized as a conflict between two loose collections of varied theoreti-
cal rationales, with free speech interests on one side and tort interests
on the other. And this theoretical conflict is fundamental to speech-
tort jurisprudence, since it is effectively a zero-sum game: When the
reasons for protecting speech collide with the reasons for establishing
tort liability, the elevation of one set of interests necessarily comes at
the expense of the other.
C. Cultural and Practical Oppositions
Beyond the theoretical realm, speech-tort cases represent the colli-
sion of diametrically opposed sets of legal assumptions and practices.
On the most fundamental level, tort law is geared towards resolving
private disputes between individuals. The substance of tort doctrine is
often established judicially, through common law development rather
than by statute. And the government usually is not a party in a tort
action; typically, the only state actor in tort suits is the court deciding
51. Zipursky, supra note 50, at 699.
52. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF TORT LAW (1987).
53. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 18–20 (4th ed.
2012).
54. See supra note 42; Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deter- R
rence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1802–11 (1997) (describing this conflict
amongst tort theorists).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-2\DPL212.txt unknown Seq: 13 21-APR-20 12:04
2020] SPEECH TORTS AND THE CONSTITUTION 507
the case.55 First Amendment law, by contrast, is public law concerned
with the relationship between individuals and the government. Thus,
in paradigmatic First Amendment cases, courts are reviewing the gov-
ernment’s direct enforcement of a speech regulation against an indi-
vidual subject to some sort of direct sanction. And this regulation is
generally the product of a clear, discrete, and direct government act.56
As David Anderson has observed, tort law and First Amendment
law make for “uneasy bedfellows” such that speech-tort jurisprudence
represents a “clash of divergent legal cultures”:57 the circumstances,
intuitions, and approaches surrounding a paradigmatic First Amend-
ment case stand in stark contrast to those surrounding a paradigmatic
tort case. Anderson has chronicled these cultural and practical opposi-
tions with considerable depth and insight, and in this Section, I sum-
marize them briefly, drawing substantially on Anderson’s work.
1. The Nature of First Amendment Law Versus Tort Law
The goal of First Amendment law is to protect individuals against
government action that oversteps the constitutional boundary.58 As
such, it is counter-majoritarian in nature: A fundamental aspect of
First Amendment doctrine is an extreme suspicion of all government
regulation within the realm of speech, with the presumption that all
such regulation is inherently suspect, even if it appears to be well-
intentioned in nature.59
First Amendment law thus tends to regard the jury with deep suspi-
cion, as it is a majoritarian institution that might seek to stamp out
unpopular views through biased decision making.60 This deep suspi-
55. See David A. Anderson, First Amendment Limitations on Tort Law, 69 BROOK. L. REV.
755, 755–56 (2004).
56. See id. at 755.
57. Id. at 759.
58. See id. at 765.
59. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
770 (1976) (stating that the government should assume that “information is not in itself harmful,
that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that
the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close them”);
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (“First Amendment freedoms are most
in danger when the government seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that impermissi-
ble end.”); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975) (“[T]he Constitution does
not permit government to decide which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently of-
fensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer.”); Dale Carpenter, The Anti-
paternalism Principle in the First Amendment, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 579, 586 (2004) (“The
Court had long been a guardian against letting the state assume the role of guardian over the
minds of the people.”).
60. See Anderson, supra note 55, at 764 (observing that “a central tenet of First Amendment
law is distrust of juries”).
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cion of the government also translates to a searching inquiry into all
possible applications of the regulation in question61—a forward-look-
ing concern that fits the regulation-focused paradigm of public law
doctrine.62 And First Amendment law generally demands extreme
narrowness and precision with respect to government regulations of
speech, as reflected in the tailoring requirements of the intermediate
and strict scrutiny standards.63
Furthermore—and of particular significance for present purposes—
First Amendment law strongly favors formulating doctrine around
clear, relatively administrable, and highly speech-protective rules, at
least when speech is regulated based on its content.64 This posture is
encapsulated in the cornerstone rule that content-based restrictions
on all speech—save a few discrete low-value speech exceptions—are
subject to strict scrutiny, which almost invariably means that the regu-
lation will be struck down.65 This rule—blunt and highly overinclusive,
but relatively clear and administrable—is rooted in the broad pre-
sumption that open-ended discretion will invariably invite government
abuse and bias. As Geoffrey Stone has described it, “[T]he Court has
appropriately embraced a ‘fortress model’ of jurisprudence that gives
judges little room to maneuver and that intentionally overprotects
speech, in order to minimize the potential harm from legislative and
administrative abuse and judicial miscalculation.”66 In the typical First
Amendment context, any benefits produced from the flexibility of
more open-ended and discretionary approaches are broadly deemed
to be outweighed by the high risk of government abuse.
This strong preference for rule-like, one-size-fits-all approaches has
been reinforced by the Court’s recent efforts to limit the degree of
segmentation and categorization within First Amendment doctrine. In
a series of cases starting with United States v. Stevens, the Court re-
jected the argument that new low-value speech categories can be es-
61. See id. at 771 (stating that “the generic strict scrutiny model of First Amendment law . . .
require[s] the court to look beyond the case at hand to the effects that liability might have on
other speakers”).
62. See Oman & Solomon, supra note 29, at 1112.
63. Anderson, supra note 55, at 759–60.
64. See David S. Han, Middle-Value Speech, 91 S. CALIF. L. REV. 65, 79–83 (2017); Anderson,
supra note 55, at 759–60 (“The culture of First Amendment jurisprudence seeks precision and
predictability . . . .”).
65. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015) (“A law that is content
based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, con-
tent-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated
speech.”).
66. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 73–74 (1987).
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tablished by categorically balancing the speech’s costs and benefits,67
despite numerous past statements to the contrary.68 Rather, it held
that new categories can only be recognized if there is “persuasive evi-
dence” that the speech in question “is part of a long (if heretofore
unrecognized) tradition of proscription.”69
Tort law, by contrast, is majoritarian in nature. It seeks to establish
and enforce community values and norms,70 and the focal point of this
pursuit is the jury—the ultimate expositor of such values and norms.71
Although, as noted above, tort law can be conceptualized instrumen-
tally as a regulatory tool, it can also be conceptualized in deontologi-
cal terms, with a backward-looking focus on effecting corrective
justice and providing civil recourse with respect to the particular inci-
dent in question.72
Tort law therefore tends to be far more comfortable with impreci-
sion, open-endedness, and contextual inquiries, encapsulated most
clearly in the “reasonable person” standard at the heart of negligence
doctrine.73 As such, it often embraces categorization and doctrinal
segmentation—the creation of discrete contextual categories to which
distinct rules apply.74 And far from viewing the adjudication and en-
67. 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010).
68. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“There are certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which
have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. . . . It has been well observed that
such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality.”); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 754–64 (1982) (classi-
fying child pornography as low-value speech based on the categorical balancing outlined in
Chaplinsky).
69. Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 546 U.S. 786, 792 (2011).
70. See Cristina Carmody Tilley, Tort Law Inside Out, 126 YALE L.J. 1320, 1325 (2017) (“Tort
has historically served as a means of determining community norms, encouraging observance of
those norms to enhance private cooperation, and stigmatizing those who deviate.”).
71. See Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 311, 380–81 (1996) (“Jury adjudication is intended to bring the moral sense of the commu-
nity to bear on controversial disputes. Thus, it draws authority from its claim to articulate the
sense of justice shared by a particular community.”); Anderson, supra note 55, at 765 (observing
that tort law “assumes that lay people are at least as likely as judges to make good decisions on
many of the questions that ultimately determine tort liability”).
72. Anderson, supra note 55, at 765 (“In tort law, telling people what they should do is a
secondary enterprise; whatever effect tort law has in guiding conduct arises from what it does
post facto in the course of adjusting losses.”).
73. Id. at 762. See also Benjamin C. Zipursky, Snyder v. Phelps, Outrageousness, and the Open
Texture of Tort Law, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 473, 495–99 (2011) (observing that “tort law is chock
full of standards and is as open textured as any area,” and defending this “open texture” of tort
law as an important means of “protecting[ing] a plaintiff’s individual right to redress”).
74. Negligence law is replete with this sort of doctrinal segmentation: distinct duty standards
apply, for example, to those acting in an emergency situation, to landowners or occupiers of
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forcement of tort judgments with suspicion, tort law embraces this as a
means of preserving and ratifying the sorts of broad value judg-
ments—reflected by jury determinations—used to identify social
wrongs warranting compensation.75
2. State Action
As noted above, the Sullivan Court made clear that the imposition
of tort liability constitutes state action that may be subject to the stric-
tures of the First Amendment.76 The state action involved in speech-
tort cases, however, is fundamentally different from that of typical
First Amendment cases. In the typical First Amendment case, the leg-
islature or executive crafts a speech regulation, and the government
enforces it directly against an individual in the form of some sort of
sanction. If the restriction on speech is content-based, the court ap-
plies some sort of scrutiny standard—typically strict scrutiny—which
requires the government to articulate both the significance of the reg-
ulatory interest in question and the extent to which the regulation is
sufficiently tailored to survive such scrutiny.77 And this justification
process occurs directly, since the government—as the direct regulator
of the conduct in question—is one of the litigants in the suit.78
By contrast, tort suits are generally initiated by private parties,
rather than the government, and the government is not usually a party
in the suit. The substance of tort doctrine is often derived from judi-
cially crafted common law rather than discrete acts of legislation or
administrative rulemaking. As such, the requisite state action comes
land, to those with physical disabilities, to professionals, to children, and so on. See 1 DAN B.
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 118–131, at 280–309 (2001).
75. See Keating, supra note 71, at 381 (observing that because jury adjudication “draws au-
thority from its claim to articulate the sense of justice shared by a particular community,” it
“legitimizes controversial outcomes even in the face of persistent disagreement”).
76. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964). Whether this accords with the
historical understanding of the First Amendment is subject to some debate. In a recent opinion
concurring in the denial of certiorari, Justice Thomas argued, “Before our decision in New York
Times, we consistently recognized that the First Amendment did not displace the common law of
libel.” McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 680 (2019). On the other hand, Eugene Volokh has
argued that “constitutional constraints on speech-based civil liability have deep roots, stretching
back to the Framing era,” marshalling evidence that “[m]any cases and commentators from that
time took for granted that civil liability was subject to constitutional constraints . . . .” Eugene
Volokh, Tort Liability and the Original Meaning of the Freedom of Speech, Press, and Petition, 96
IOWA L. REV. 249, 250, 259 (2010).
77. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (“Content-based laws—
those that target speech based on its communicative content—are presumptively unconstitu-
tional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve
compelling state interests.”).
78. See Anderson, supra note 55, at 766–68.
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only in the form of the court’s application of a state rule of law,79
rather than from a direct act of enforcement by the government upon
an individual.80
This posture makes for an odd fit between tort cases and the proto-
typical scrutiny-based approach to evaluating First Amendment cases.
If the government is required to articulate the important or compel-
ling interests served by the regulation and to defend the fit between
the regulation and the interests in question, it is unclear who repre-
sents the state in doing so within the speech-tort context. It is, to a
certain extent, the plaintiff, since “only the plaintiff has a specific
stake that will be lost if the state’s interest is not successfully de-
fended.”81 But it is also, to a certain extent, the court, given that it is
both the sole state actor in the suit and (in the traditional common law
context) the ultimate originator of the law in question.82 This, of
course, puts the court in the awkward position of acting as both arbi-
ter of the dispute in question and defender of the state’s interests in
preserving the common law rule in question.83
3. Regulation versus Individual Justice
Finally, as Nathan Oman and Jason Solomon have discussed in de-
tail, a fundamental tension exists between the clearly regulatory na-
ture of typical First Amendment cases and the more complex nature
of tort law.84 First Amendment law is public law concerned with the
relationship between individuals and the government; in the prototyp-
ical First Amendment case—like, for example, a statute criminalizing
speech—the government’s action is clearly regulatory in nature, with
the forward-looking goal of discouraging the speech in question.
Tort law, however, is more complex. If conceptualized in purely in-
strumental terms, it is similarly regulatory in nature, with the goal of
79. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265 (“Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the
Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restric-
tions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It matters not that that law has been
applied in a civil action and that it is common law only . . . .”).
80. See Anderson, supra note 55, at 767–78.
81. Id. at 771. As Anderson observed, this places plaintiffs in an awkward position. Unlike the
government acting in its regulatory capacity, a plaintiff’s sole concern is usually to seek relief in
her own particular case. In the quasi-regulatory speech-tort context, however, plaintiffs are ex-
pected to broadly justify the rule as applied in a wide range of cases well beyond the scope of the
plaintiff’s own case. See id. at 772–73.
82. See id. at 767–78.
83. Id. at 769–70.
84. Oman & Solomon, supra note 29, at 1137–43.
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incentivizing individuals to act in a socially optimal manner.85 This is
how the Court has generally framed the tort actions in its speech-tort
cases: The state is using private tort actions as a means to accomplish
its regulatory goals—such as the suppression of harmful speech—in a
manner that is essentially indistinguishable from a direct criminal
prohibition.86
As discussed above, however, this is only one particular conception
of tort law. The core purpose of tort law may also be conceptualized
as deontological in nature, with the goal of effecting individual justice
within the specific case at hand.87 As Benjamin Zipursky described it,
“Tort law, unlike criminal law or regulation, is not a series of general
prohibitions or restrictions promulgated and then enforced by the
state. It is a system for empowering private parties to use the courts to
redress wrongful injuries done to them by others.”88 If viewed in this
manner, private tort actions do not resemble the sort of state action
that ought to be subject to intense scrutiny under the First
Amendment.89
II. CONCEPTUALIZING SPEECH-TORT CASES
A. The Court’s Approach to Speech-Tort Jurisprudence
The foundational theoretical, cultural, and practical conflicts out-
lined above create an inherent tension within speech-tort cases. If one
views such cases purely through the First Amendment lens, the appli-
cation of tort law—through judicial determinations of tort liability—is
ultimately no different than other, more direct means of government
regulation. This would therefore justify the same sorts of blunt, cate-
gorical, and highly prophylactic approaches that are inherently tied to
First Amendment doctrine’s deep suspicion of government abuse. On
the other hand, if viewed purely through the private law lens, speech-
tort cases are primarily about individual justice, with the goal of pro-
viding compensation and recourse in cases where private parties
wrongfully inflict social harms on others. This might therefore favor
85. See id. at 1112 (critiquing “the Supreme Court’s theory of private law—one that follows
the dominant view of private law as a species of government regulation . . . .”).
86. See id. at 1140.
87. As discussed above, this may be premised on a corrective justice or civil recourse concep-
tion of tort law. See supra Section I.B; Oman & Solomon, supra note 29, at 1119–25 (describing
the alternate conception of private law as individual justice).
88. Zipursky, supra note 73, at 478.
89. See Oman & Solomon, supra note 29, at 1145 (observing that “in providing recourse
through the private law, the state is not primarily regulating or punishing speech”).
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the backward-looking, highly contextual, and open-ended approaches
typically adopted in the tort context.
In Sullivan, the Court quite explicitly adopted the former approach.
It conflated the private libel suit in question with the Sedition Act,
observing that “[w]hat a State may not constitutionally bring about by
means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law
of libel.”90 In the Court’s eyes, awarding libel damages in a suit
brought by a public official for criticism of official conduct was no
different from directly criminalizing seditious libel. The Court’s ap-
proach therefore reflected the same basic intuitions and values that
are emblematic of traditional First Amendment contexts: a strong em-
phasis on avoiding chilling effects and an intense suspicion of the
state’s motives. And this strong First Amendment bent was directly
reflected in the doctrinal approach the Court ultimately adopted: the
establishment of a relatively simple, highly prophylactic,91 and cate-
gorical “actual malice” rule in defamation cases brought by public
officials.92
In its post-Sullivan defamation cases, the Court introduced some
nuance into this approach. In Gertz, it held that when private figures
are suing regarding defamatory statements on issues of public con-
cern, the state could constitutionally allow plaintiffs to recover actual
damages based merely on a showing of negligence.93 Later, in Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., the Court suggested that
in cases dealing with private figures suing for defamatory statements
regarding issues of private concern, the permissive standards of com-
mon law defamation can constitutionally be applied without any mod-
ifications,94 indicating that within at least some subsets of speech-tort
90. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964).
91. See id. at 271–72 (observing that “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and . . .
it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they
need to survive”). The Sullivan test is prophylactic because it protects some speech that is, as a
technical matter, constitutionally worthless—false statements of fact that cause reputational
damage—in order to ensure that risk-averse speakers are not chilled from engaging in constitu-
tionally protected speech. Such speakers may be chilled due to the risk of judicial error or con-
cerns about their ability to marshal proof regarding their speech’s proper classification, among
other reasons. See generally Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling
the “Chilling Effect”, 58 B.U. L. REV. 685 (1978).
92. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80.
93. Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
94. 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (plurality opinion) (holding that in plaintiffs in such cases may
recover presumed and punitive damages without a showing of actual malice). Although only
four Justices joined the plurality opinion in Dun & Bradstreet, both Chief Justice Warren Burger
and Justice Byron White, in separate opinions concurring in the judgment, appeared to agree
with the basic rationale of the plurality opinion, though both would have overruled Gertz. Id. at
764 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 774 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
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jurisprudence, states still have free rein to craft tort doctrine with no
(or only minimal) constitutional constraints. In neither of these cases,
however, was the Court’s holding explicitly driven by any overarching
sense that the speech-tort context was exceptional in some fundamen-
tal way; rather, it undertook the same sort of interest-balancing be-
tween speech and regulatory interests typical of traditional First
Amendment jurisprudence, albeit at a more generalized level.95
In the decades following Sullivan, the Court largely adhered to the
defamation framework in speech-tort cases falling outside of the defa-
mation context. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Court applied the same ac-
tual malice standard to a claim for false light invasion of privacy.96
And in Hustler v. Falwell, the Court held that public figures and public
officials could not recover for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress (IIED) on the basis of a work of parody “without showing in
addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which
was made with ‘actual malice.’”97 Neither case represented much of a
departure from the defamation context of Sullivan and its progeny.
Although false light claims are technically distinct from defamation
claims, their overlap with defamation is substantial—so much so that
some states have declined to recognize false light as a separate
claim.98 And Falwell was, in effect, a defamation case in disguise—an
attempt on the part of a public figure plaintiff to plead IIED in order
to circumvent the stringent constitutional requirements he would have
to meet for a defamation claim.99 Some lower courts, however, started
to apply the Court’s defamation approach to a wider variety of tort
contexts, including right of publicity100 and intentional interference
with contractual relations and prospective economic relations.101
95. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348 (premising its loosening of the stringent Sullivan standard in
private figure defamation cases on “the strong and legitimate state interest in compensating
private individuals for injury to reputation”); Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 760 (plurality opin-
ion) (observing that while speech on a matter of private concern “is not totally unprotected by
the First Amendment, . . . its protections are less stringent”).
96. 385 U.S. 374, 390–91 (1967).
97. 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
98. See, e.g., Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Tex. 1994) (rejecting false light tort
because “it largely duplicates other rights of recovery, particularly defamation”); Lake v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998) (declining to recognize false light due to
concerns that “claims under false light are similar to claims of defamation”).
99. See, e.g., David A. Logan, Masked Media: Judges, Juries, and the Law of Surreptitious
Newsgathering, 83 IOWA L. REV. 161, 169 (1997) (“Read for all it’s worth, Falwell sounded the
death knell for efforts to circumvent New York Times by the artful pleading of alternative tort
theories, at least when the focus is on the content of the article.”).
100. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001).
101. See Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Inv’r’s Servs., 175 F.3d 848, 856–58 (10th
Cir. 1999); Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1058 (9th Cir. 1990).
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In the 2011 case of Snyder v. Phelps, the Court confronted a tradi-
tional speech-tort case completely divorced from the defamation con-
text.102 In Snyder, the Westboro Baptist Church picketed at the
funeral of Matthew Snyder, a marine who had been killed in Iraq. As
the funeral procession passed, church members held up signs that
stated, among other things, “Thank God for IEDs,” “Thank God for
Dead Soldiers,” “God Hates Fags,” and “You’re Going to Hell.”103
Snyder’s father sued Westboro for IIED, among other claims.104
At trial, the jury found that the church’s actions met all of the com-
mon law elements of the tort and awarded Snyder’s father $2.9 million
in compensatory damages, along with punitive damages.105 Neverthe-
less, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment exempted the
church from all tort liability. The Court’s holding turned largely on its
determination that the speech in question constituted speech regard-
ing issues of public concern—the sort of speech that is “at the heart of
the First Amendment’s protection.”106 As such, the Court observed
that while such speech “can . . . inflict great pain[,] . . . we cannot react
to that pain by punishing the speaker.”107
Snyder dealt with a speech-tort claim falling well outside of the def-
amation context. The nub of the claim in Snyder was not that the
statements in question were false or that they damaged the plaintiff’s
reputation. Rather, Snyder involved a straightforward IIED claim,
102. 562 U.S. 443, 450 (2011). Although Snyder’s suit against the Westboro defendants in-
cluded a defamation claim, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on
that claim, and the case as analyzed by the Supreme Court was far afield from the typical defa-
mation context. See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 107-109. R
103. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 448.
104. Id. at 450. Snyder raises an interesting question with respect to the Supreme Court’s
doctrine regarding low-value speech—that is, those established categories of speech, such as
obscenity, defamation, incitement, and fighting words, that are broadly deemed to be unpro-
tected such that the government has significant freedom to regulate them based on content. See
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010). One might argue that under the Stevens
test for low-value speech, the imposition of tort liability in speech-tort cases—which is almost
invariably premised on the content of the speech—is constitutional only insofar as it applies to
one of the historically recognized categories of low-value speech, which (at the moment) does
not include speech causing IIED. Id. at 471–72 (holding that a discrete subset of speech may be
classified as low-value only if it “ha[s] been historically unprotected”). I do not focus on this
question here for two reasons. First, as I have previously argued, the Court’s “historical” analysis
in the Stevens context is so open-ended as to be largely illusory, giving the Court ample freedom
to classify such speech as low-value if it so chooses. Second, all of the Justices in Snyder recog-
nized the possibility of upholding speech-based IIED liability under an appropriate set of facts,
despite the fact that such speech does not obviously fall into any of the presently recognized
categories of low-value speech. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Han, supra note
9, at 1147–50.
105. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 450.
106. Id. at 451–52.
107. Id. at 460–61.
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which under Maryland law required the plaintiff to prove “that the
defendant intentionally or recklessly engaged in extreme and outra-
geous conduct that caused the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional dis-
tress.”108 And although these elements are generally deemed to be
highly stringent in nature, there appeared to be no dispute throughout
the appeal regarding the jury’s finding that the elements were met
under Maryland tort law.109
In analyzing the case, however, the Court continued to adhere to a
purely public-law-based approach. It presumed the broad conceptual
equivalence between speech-tort cases and run-of-the-mill First
Amendment cases, frequently drawing direct comparisons between
the case at hand and traditional First Amendment cases outside of the
tort context.110 It characterized the application of tort law as no differ-
ent than direct government regulation, stating that “[i]f there is a bed-
rock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”111 It therefore
viewed the jury as simply a vehicle of the government—one that must
be viewed with suspicion when operating within the realm of
speech.112
Consistent with the Court’s framing of the case, its analytical focus
was not on the special complications presented by the tort context, but
rather entirely on traditional First Amendment concerns regarding the
nature of the regulation in question and the value of the regulated
speech. Given that the protestors “had the right to be where they
were,” the Court effectively premised the result entirely on its judg-
ment that their speech was on a matter of public concern,113 which
“occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment val-
ues, and is entitled to special protection.”114 And it focused on the
content-based nature of the IIED inquiry, highlighting the malleable
nature of the “outrageousness” standard and contrasting the case at
108. Id. at 451.
109. See id. at 464 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Although the elements of the IIED tort are difficult
to meet, respondents long ago abandoned any effort to show that those tough standards were
not satisfied here.”).
110. See, e.g., id. at 453–54 (citing cases dealing with direct regulation of government employ-
ees’ speech); id. at 457 (citing cases dealing with direct government restrictions on picketing
activities).
111. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 458 (emphasis added).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 457–58.
114. Id. at 450; see also Gordon, supra note 17, at 46 (characterizing Snyder as “absolutist,”
with a “conception of the First Amendment [that] precludes state common-law tort liability at-
taching to speech whose content is of public concern”).
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hand to far less problematic content-neutral restrictions on funeral
protests.115
The Snyder Court’s analytical approach reflected its continued ad-
herence to the culture and practices of First Amendment law rather
than tort law in its speech-tort cases. It viewed the application of tort
law as no different than direct state regulation, and it therefore ap-
proached the case with the counter-majoritarian posture characteristic
of First Amendment law—one marked by a deep suspicion of govern-
ment abuse through the instrument of the jury in a private tort suit. It
emphasized the dangers of chilling effects on protected speech, ob-
serving that “[a]s a Nation we have chosen . . . to protect even hurtful
speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public
debate.”116
The Snyder Court therefore followed Sullivan’s general approach of
articulating broad, categorical rules to overprotect speech given the
broad potential for chilling effects and government abuse. Despite the
Court’s half-hearted attempt, at the end of its opinion, to narrow the
scope of its holding to the facts of the present case,117 the Court’s
blunt approach indicated that the question of First Amendment pro-
tection rested entirely on whether the speech in question was on a
matter of public concern (as long as it took place at a location where
the speaker had a right to be).118
To be sure, the Court’s speech-tort jurisprudence has been rela-
tively sparse, and it may be difficult to draw any clear conclusions as
to how it might approach future speech-tort cases based solely on Sny-
der. But as Jeffrey Steven Gordon has chronicled in detail, post-Sny-
der cases in state courts have generally ignored the Court’s limiting
language, construing Snyder as setting forth a broad principle categor-
ically prohibiting tort liability when the allegedly tortious act in ques-
tion is speech on a matter of public concern.119 And these courts have
applied this principle not only in the IIED context, but also in cases
115. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011).
116. Id. at 461.
117. See id. at 460 (“Our holding today is narrow. We are required in First Amendment cases
to carefully review the record, and the reach of our opinion here is limited by the particular facts
before us.”).
118. Id. at 458 (“Given that Westboro’s speech was at a public place on a matter of public
concern, that speech is entitled to ‘special protection’ under the First Amendment. Such speech
cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.”). Cf. Erica Goldberg,
Competing Free Speech Values in an Age of Protest, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2163, 2174–75 (2018)
(stating that in speech-tort cases, “the government cannot regulate speech, even to promote
more speech, if that speech touches on a matter of public concern or is newsworthy”).
119. See Gordon, supra note 17, at 32–45.
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raising other tort claims, such as intentional interference with contrac-
tual relations.120
All of this, of course, stands in stark contrast to the culture and
practices of tort law. As discussed above, deontological theories of
tort law conceptualize it as a means of effecting individual justice be-
tween private parties rather than as an instrument of government reg-
ulation.121 Tort law embraces communitarian values as articulated by
a jury of one’s peers, and the judgment of the jury is valued—rather
than feared—as the best means of elucidating community norms in
determining what ought to constitute social wrongs warranting civil
redress. It views deterrence—the chilling of socially harmful actions—
as a benefit rather than a problem.122 And it does so under a broad
posture that invites flexible, open-ended, and tailored analyses that
focus specifically on the case at hand while remaining anchored to a
longstanding body of common law.123
B. The Problem with the Court’s Approach
The fundamental problem with the Court’s present approach to
speech-tort cases is its failure to grapple with the distinctive features
of the speech-tort context—features that meaningfully distinguish
such cases from run-of-the-mill First Amendment cases. The unique
nature, posture, and context of most speech-tort cases do not merit
the same sort of extreme suspicion of government abuse and fear of
impermissible chilling effects that are characteristic of traditional First
Amendment contexts. The Court therefore need not adhere to the
sort of blunt, categorical, and highly prophylactic approaches broadly
associated with traditional First Amendment doctrine—approaches
that are particularly ill-suited for the wide variety of different speech-
tort contexts that resist simple categorization.
As discussed above, the Court, starting in Sullivan, has broadly con-
ceptualized speech-tort cases as effectively no different from run-of-
the-mill First Amendment cases, posing the same risks of chilling ef-
fects and government abuse as, say, the direct enforcement of a crimi-
nal prohibition on speech. Sullivan, however, represented a perfect
storm of these concerns at their very apex. Sullivan was a public offi-
cial—a police commissioner—who was suing a newspaper regarding
allegedly defamatory statements regarding his official actions. Fur-
thermore, Alabama libel law made it particularly easy for him to re-
120. Id. at 32–35, 37–38.
121. See supra Section I.B.
122. See Anderson, supra note 55, at 775.
123. See Zipursky, supra note 73, at 495–99.
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cover a substantial amount of damages on only a limited showing;
given that the statements in question were deemed libelous per se, all
that Sullivan had to prove was that the defendant published the state-
ment and that the publication referred generally to police actions
(even if it never referred to him directly by name or position).124
It therefore made sense for the Sullivan Court to elide any distinc-
tion between the tort suit in question and direct government regula-
tion. Sullivan—a public official—was directly seeking to silence
criticism of his official actions, raising the same deep-seated concerns
with government abuse associated with seditious libel. And if Sulli-
van’s lawsuit effectively represented direct government regulation,
then the $500,000 damages judgment created a clear, direct, and sub-
stantial chilling effect on protected speech; such a massive judgment
would surely dissuade anyone from criticizing official actions in Ala-
bama. As John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky observed, “Sullivan
presented such a strong case for recognition of First Amendment lim-
its on ‘tort’ liability because it was a criminal prosecution dressed up
as a civil defamation action.”125
But the Court’s wholesale conflation of speech-tort cases with tradi-
tional First Amendment cases does not typically hold true outside of
the idiosyncratic context of that case. In a more run-of-the-mill tort
case like Snyder, which involved a common law tort claim between
two private parties, the degree to which the operation of tort law
raises First Amendment concerns is a far more complicated question.
Let’s start with the issue of government abuse. In the paradigmatic
First Amendment context, the risk of systematic government abuse is
clear. Take, for example, a criminal prohibition on dangerous advo-
cacy. The speech restriction arises under a discrete act of legislation
that is purely regulatory in nature: its goal is to influence people’s be-
havior in ways the government deems to be beneficial. Furthermore,
the government directly decides, through the exercise of its
prosecutorial discretion, when exactly it will enforce the law—it is the
government itself that initiates any proceedings against speakers. As
such, the government has complete and direct control over the sort of
speech that will be targeted, the particular parties that will be subject
to the regulation, and when (and how often) the regulation will be
enforced. And this sort of substantial, systematic risk of government
abuse was largely present in Sullivan: in effect, the government—
124. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1964).
125. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Supreme Court’s Stealth Return to the
Common Law of Torts, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 433, 438 (2016).
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through a private tort action directly initiated by one of its officials—
sought to silence speech critical of its actions.
This potential for systematic abuse, however, is far more attenuated
in run-of-the-mill common law tort cases between two private parties.
Most obviously, the government plays no direct role in initiating pri-
vate tort actions—it is private parties that initiate such suits. The gov-
ernment therefore lacks the capacity to control the frequency and
manage the contexts in which such tort claims will be invoked.126
Thus, if one of the core concerns underlying First Amendment protec-
tion is the fear that the political branches of the government—those
most directly beholden to majoritarian preferences—will manipulate
the marketplace of ideas, then most common law tort claims are a
particularly ineffective means of doing so: the legislature and execu-
tive are merely spectators observing the outcomes of tort suits, gov-
erned by judicially crafted common law, that happen to be filed by
private party plaintiffs.
Of course, as stated above, the state action in speech-tort cases
comes not from the political branches, but from courts’ application of
state rules of law. But despite the Court’s recognition that the risk of
government abuse generally extends to courts as well as the political
branches,127 there are many reasons to regard this sort of state action
with incrementally less of a knee-jerk fear of government abuse than
direct regulation. Courts cannot set their own agendas: They have lit-
tle control over the lawsuits that private litigants file, and unlike the
legislature, they are constrained by the particular parties, disputes,
and factual circumstances presented to them. So even if, say, a partic-
ular judge were dead-set on suppressing unpopular speech, whether
the judge ever has the opportunity to do so is largely a matter of hap-
penstance. And even when such a case is before a judge, liability de-
terminations are largely in the hands of the jury, which further dilutes
the potential for abuse rooted in judges’ actions.
Furthermore, as an institutional matter, courts are situated differ-
ently from the political branches. The legislature and the executive are
majoritarian institutions, popularly elected with the goal of serving
their constituents. In the First Amendment context, however, courts
are institutionally tasked with checking the excesses of majoritarian
rule and protecting unpopular speakers and viewpoints—they are ulti-
mately the counter-majoritarian protector of free speech values. In
126. See Oman & Solomon, supra note 29, at 1141, 1148 (“One of the core features of the law
of private wrongs is that nothing happens unless a wronged plaintiff chooses to sue.”).
127. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (extending the broad prohibition on
prior restraints under the First Amendment to injunctions).
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line with this institutional role, federal judges are shielded from the
political process through lifetime tenure.128
In addition—unlike in direct-regulation speech cases where the gov-
ernment is an active litigant—courts in speech-tort cases are not posi-
tioned as partisan defenders of a particular rule. Indeed, they are
often operating in a common-law context, in which there is no discrete
legislative or executive act to be defended, but rather an amorphous
and wide-ranging body of common law with which the presiding judge
may have had little to no connection in developing.129 In the common
law context, the court operates with the clear understanding that the
law is not static, but rather is meant to evolve organically as varying
circumstances arise. The court is—at least formally—the impartial ar-
biter of the dispute, working within a doctrinal context that gives it
some flexibility to clarify and modify the doctrine in question.130 Thus,
at least as a matter of institutional role, one might have lesser reasons
to suspect impermissible government abuse on the part of courts in
adjudicating speech-tort cases.
Finally, as a theoretical matter, classifying the nature of courts’ ac-
tions in speech-tort cases is a far more complex endeavor than classi-
fying legislative action. As discussed above, the political branches’
actions in creating and enforcing direct speech restrictions are clearly
regulatory in nature—they are designed primarily to influence peo-
ple’s behavior. But tort law is not simply—and, to many, not prima-
rily—a means of regulation; rather, it is also driven by the state’s
strong interest in providing compensation and recourse to the individ-
ual plaintiff in question, who has suffered harm as a result of the de-
fendant’s socially wrongful actions.131 As Zipursky observed, “The
state’s role is one of referee and enforcer when one individual de-
mands to have another held responsible to her; that is very different
from the role of prosecutor and punisher.”132 Viewed in this manner,
128. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
hold their Offices during good Behaviour . . . .”); David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Retaining Life
Tenure: The Case for a “Gold Parachute”, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1397, 1424 (2005) (describing life
tenure’s “power to shield judges from interference by the political branches and the people,
leaving them free to fairly and correctly interpret the counter-majoritarian Constitution”).
129. See Anderson, supra note 55, at 755 (observing that in speech-tort cases, the First
Amendment threat exists “in the operation of the common law, the articulation of which is
scattered, incomplete, possibly changing, and sometimes contradictory”); Gordon, supra note 17,
at 31 (contrasting the “fixed, canonical” nature of legislation with the organic, continuously re-
visable nature of the common law).
130. See Zipursky, supra note 73, at 497–98.
131. See Oman & Solomon, supra note 29, at 1119–25.
132. Zipursky, supra note 73, at 497–98; see also Oman & Solomon, supra note 29, at 1145
(arguing that “the concerns underlying the First Amendment are not necessarily as salient in
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tort law is backward-looking rather than forward-looking: The pri-
mary rationale for imposing liability in a given speech-tort case may
not be to deter similar speech in the future (although that might be
the effect), but to effect individual justice.133
To be clear, I am not arguing here that there is no potential for
government abuse in the speech-tort context or that any such poten-
tial abuse cannot be the basis for First Amendment protection. If
judges (and juries) are viewed as state actors, the potential for abuse is
clear: If they are biased against certain unpopular viewpoints (either
consciously or subconsciously), then the speech-tort context gives
them ample opportunities to operationalize these biases in deciding
individual speech-tort cases and crafting speech-tort doctrine through
common-law development. But such concerns should not be con-
ceived as the equivalent of those raised by direct state action, given
the extent to which courts’ power is circumscribed by the case-driven,
private-party-initiated context of speech-tort cases; courts’ very differ-
ent institutional roles as compared to the political branches; and the
strong, non-regulatory theoretical bases upon which traditional tort
law largely rests.
All of these complexities paint a clearer picture of how speech-tort
doctrine should be conceptualized. It is inaccurate to say, as a categor-
ical matter, that speech-tort cases are just the same as run-of-the-mill
First Amendment cases (as the Court has appeared to presume), or
that they are simply private law cases to which the First Amendment
has little relevance. As noted above, just as light is both particle and
wave, speech-tort jurisprudence is First Amendment law and tort law
at the same time: both public law and private law; both regulatory and
compensatory; and the product of both state action and private
initiative.
This unique, dual nature of speech-tort cases is captured in the com-
plex role of the jury in such cases. On the one hand, the jury is com-
posed of private citizens who play a vital role as the ultimate
expositors of social values in the tort context—it is up to the jury to
determine when one’s actions may be deemed sufficiently wrongful as
to justify recompense. At the same time, the jury’s institutional role in
reaching a verdict may be conceptualized as state action, and in this
context, its actions carry the same risk of government abuse—specifi-
cases in which a private party brings a lawsuit” because “in providing recourse through the pri-
vate law, the state is not primarily regulating or punishing speech”).
133. See Anderson, supra note 55, at 765 (“In tort law, telling people what they should do is a
secondary enterprise; whatever effect tort law has in guiding conduct arises from what it does
post facto in the course of adjusting losses.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-2\DPL212.txt unknown Seq: 29 21-APR-20 12:04
2020] SPEECH TORTS AND THE CONSTITUTION 523
cally, a majoritarian institution stamping out unpopular minority view-
points—as more traditional state action. It is therefore difficult to
classify the jury in purely one manner or the other within the speech-
tort context. Jurors are both private individuals and state actors; they
are both valuable expositors of social values and engines for
majoritarian attacks on unpopular viewpoints; and they are both ex
post arbiters of past disputes and ex ante regulators of future speakers.
Thus, in practical terms, speech-tort cases are perhaps best concep-
tualized as a joint venture between private parties and the govern-
ment.134 A liability judgment in a speech-tort case is ultimately the
product of a private actor electing to initiate a lawsuit against another
private actor—a suit for which liability will often rest, to a significant
extent, on the judgment of a jury composed of private individuals. It is
also the product of state machinery in the form of the courts applying
judicially developed common law rules, yielding liability judgments
that rest upon state enforcement power, which may well be influenced
by the same sorts of conscious or subconscious biases that lie at the
heart of our suspicion of any government action limiting speech. It is
driven by both instrumental, regulatory considerations and deontolog-
ical concerns regarding individual justice. It emerges from a context in
which the court is both impartial arbiter in a private dispute and sole
state actor wielding the power to suppress unpopular speech.
In short, speech-tort jurisprudence is a distinctive, hybrid private/
public context in which the extreme suspicion of illicit motives associ-
ated with direct state action need not apply as categorically as in the
traditional First Amendment context. And this dual nature of speech-
tort cases has important implications as to how any associated chilling
effects should be conceptualized. As noted above, one of the primary
concerns driving the Court’s decision in Sullivan was the potential for
chilling effects on protected speech—the possibility that risk-averse
speakers, fearing tort liability, would steer clear of engaging in pro-
tected speech given the risk that courts may erroneously impose tort
liability on such speech. And given that these chilling effects ulti-
mately arise from the court’s adjudication of a tort suit—even if that
suit is between private parties—it is natural to think of them as the
product of state action.
But unlike in the direct regulation context, courts cannot simply es-
tablish speech-chilling tort doctrines by fiat. The state action in ques-
tion is ultimately beholden to private action—it requires a private
134. Cf. Oman & Solomon, supra note 29, at 1141 (observing that in cases like Snyder, “ ‘the
state’ is at once everywhere and nowhere”).
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party not only to initiate the lawsuit, but to proceed with the suit to
the point where the court can make some substantive determination
regarding the merits of the case. And private parties do not make
these decisions in a vacuum; they (presumably) do so based not only
on the current state of the law, but also on their perceptions of the
sorts of social judgments that drive the application of the relevant law
(for example, the extent to which the average person would exclaim,
“Outrageous!” upon hearing the facts of the case in question).135 Pri-
vate parties (and the lawyers that represent them) usually will not un-
dertake the time and expense of filing a lawsuit unless there is some
reasonable prospect of success, and in the open-textured realm of tort
law, this calculation will often rest to a significant extent on their own
sense of shared social norms—for example, when the defendant’s ac-
tions so exceed the bounds of proper social behavior that compensa-
tion is warranted.
As such—at least in the context of a traditional common-law tort
claim arising between two private parties—any chilling effects on
speech produced by the court’s actions are, practically speaking, the
product of both state and private action. And to illustrate how this
should influence our perception of these chilling effects, imagine three
distinct scenarios, each of which produces chilling effects of equal
magnitude on protected speech. In the first scenario, the chilling is
produced by a criminal statute; in the second, it is produced by knowl-
edge that the community will publicly shame the speaker; and in the
third, it is produced by the specter of a private tort action.
The chilling in the first scenario is constitutionally problematic to
the fullest extent, since it is produced by direct fear of government
prosecution. The second scenario, by contrast, poses no constitutional
issues, since the chilling is produced by fear that private parties will
impose social sanctions on the speaker. If the public at large is hostile
to a particular minority viewpoint, then private individuals are of
course free to express their displeasure through, for example, ostraciz-
ing the speaker, subjecting the speaker to withering criticism, or
ridiculing the speaker, even though these actions would clearly pro-
duce a chilling effect on unpopular speech. We may not deem some of
these actions to be consistent with broader free speech values, but the
chilling effects produced by them do not raise any technical First
Amendment problems.
135. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965) (describing “extreme and out-
rageous” conduct as conduct for which “the recitation of the facts to an average member of the
community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim,
‘Outrageous!’”).
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The third scenario occupies a middle ground. The chilling produced
by the specter of traditional tort liability is constitutionally problem-
atic—but to a lesser extent than that produced in the direct regulation
context—because the speech-tort context represents an amalgam of
the two other scenarios: The chilling is produced by fear that private
parties will impose sanctions on the speaker, but through the use of
government machinery in the form of state common law courts.
So the chilling effects produced in a case like Snyder certainly have
constitutional import: Anytime protected speech is chilled by the im-
position of common law tort liability, state action is technically pre-
sent and First Amendment limitations on tort law may be justified.
And one can imagine discrete situations—like in the Sullivan con-
text—where it might make sense to fully equate the chilling effects
produced by the operation of state tort law with those produced in the
typical direct regulation context. But because these chilling effects are
also the product of private action, they should generally raise lesser
constitutional concerns than in the direct regulation context, where
the government has the freedom to chill speech directly in the manner
of its own choosing without any reliance on private action.
Thus, given the categorically lower risk of government abuse posed
in the speech-tort context, courts need not adhere to the same ex-
treme suspicion of all state action that is central to traditional First
Amendment doctrine. They therefore have some freedom to loosen,
at least incrementally, the strong First Amendment preference for cat-
egorical, highly prophylactic, and relatively administrable rule-like ap-
proaches in favor of more open-ended, contextualized, standard-like
approaches that can be tailored to better fit the complex nature of
speech-tort cases. If most speech-tort cases can be conceptualized as a
joint venture driven in part by private action and in part by the state,
then the Court can reasonably lower its guard (if only by a few inches)
in crafting speech-tort doctrine.
III. ADOPTING MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACHES
IN SPEECH-TORT CASES
A. The Factual and Doctrinal Eclecticism of Speech-Tort Cases
To say that courts should be incrementally more comfortable in
adopting open-ended, standard-like approaches in speech-tort cases
does not mean that they should adopt such approaches in all circum-
stances. Under the basic rules-versus-standards framework, rule-like
approaches provide clarity, predictability, and administrability; they
cabin judicial discretion and produce consistent outcomes that allow
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people to conform their behavior accordingly.136 This comes, however,
at the cost of rigidity: they are by nature over- or under-inclusive,
leading to anomalous outcomes in certain cases.137
Standard-like approaches, on the other hand, allow for greater flexi-
bility, permitting decisionmakers to exercise discretion and make
judgments tailored around a wider variety of contextual factors.138
They also render the doctrine less clear, predictable, and adminis-
trable, which may chill risk-averse people from undertaking socially
useful activities.139 Given this dynamic, an incremental shift towards
the standards side of the spectrum makes sense only when the incre-
mental gains associated with adopting more flexible, tailored ap-
proaches outweigh the incremental losses associated with reduced
clarity and administrability.
As discussed above, the unique nature of the speech-tort context
should produce a comparatively lesser fear of government abuse and
impermissible chilling effects than in the traditional First Amendment
context, which translates to a comparatively greater comfort with the
exercise of judicial discretion. And on the other side of the equation,
standard-like approaches that allow courts to incorporate more con-
textualized inquiries will often carry substantial value given the signifi-
cant complexity and eclecticism of speech-tort cases.
But even if speech-tort cases can be broadly conceptualized as joint
ventures involving both private initiative and state action, not all
speech-tort joint ventures are the same. Practically speaking, the de-
gree of constitutional concern raised by a particular speech-tort con-
text varies based on a broad intuitional judgment regarding the
likelihood and potential risk of government mischief—the purposeful
manipulation of the marketplace of ideas—within that context. And
this judgment rests on two closely linked inquiries.
The first is the extent to which the government, as opposed to a
private party, is driving the tort action in question: The more that the
government rather than a private party drives the tort action, the
more it resembles the sort of direct regulation justifying the extreme
suspicion of government abuse typical of First Amendment jurispru-
136. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 384–85 (1985); Kath-
leen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Stan-
dards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 62–63 (1992).
137. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1685, 1689 (1976) (“The choice of rules as the mode of intervention involves the sacrifice
of precision in the achievement of the objectives lying behind the rules.”).
138. See, e.g., Schlag, supra note 136, at 385; Sullivan, supra note 136, at 58–62.
139. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 136, at 62 (“Standards produce uncertainty, thereby chilling
socially productive behavior.”).
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dence. To be clear, this inquiry is distinct from the purely binary state
action question; as Sullivan made clear, state action technically exists
anytime a court imposes tort liability based on the application of state
law.140 Rather, it poses a more pragmatic question: To what extent
should tort liability in the given context be characterized as govern-
ment regulation of speech versus individual recourse driven by private
initiative?141
The second inquiry is the extent to which the particular factual and
doctrinal circumstances in question are either suggestive of, or highly
conducive to, the broad suppression of valuable speech, either directly
or through chilling effects. Of course, the greater the likelihood that
valuable speech will be suppressed by the imposition of tort liability,
and the broader the scope of speech subject to direct or indirect sup-
pression, the greater the degree of constitutional concern.
These two closely linked inquiries142 form the basis for a broad intu-
itional judgment regarding the likelihood and potential risk of govern-
ment mischief—the purposeful manipulation of the marketplace of
ideas—within each particular speech-tort context. The more that we
suspect that some sort of actual or potential government mischief is
involved—either within the adjudication of the particular case at hand
or in the potential future ramifications of the ruling—the more willing
we are to find a First Amendment violation calling for the establish-
ment of constitutional boundaries. And this broad intuitional judg-
ment is ultimately the product of a wide and eclectic range of factual
and doctrinal factors, a number of which I discuss in detail below.
Before turning to these factors, however, it is worth clarifying the
exact contours of my argument here. I am not arguing that rule-like
approaches should never be adopted in speech-tort cases or that the
Court should always adopt completely open-ended, case-by-case bal-
140. See Oman & Solomon, supra note 29, at 1145 (“The state-action doctrine is unitary; ei-
ther something is state action, or it is not.”). As Oman and Solomon note, the binary nature of
the state action doctrine cannot adequately account for the different degrees of formal state
involvement in speech-tort cases. See id.; see also infra Section III.A.3.
141. This judgment may be a messy one, as it extends beyond cut-and-dry factors like the
government’s technical involvement in the case. For example, as discussed above, the jury can be
characterized either as private individuals acting as ex post arbiters of past disputes or as govern-
ment actors acting as engines for majoritarian attacks on unpopular viewpoints. See supra Sec-
tion II.B. How exactly the jury is best characterized in a given case will ultimately rest on one’s
intuitional judgments regarding the particular circumstances and context of that case.
142. The inquiries will often overlap in practice. For example, the greater the risk that valua-
ble speech will be suppressed by the imposition of tort liability, the more likely we may be to
characterize the imposition of such liability as effectively regulatory and government-driven in
nature rather than private. On the other hand, when it appears that the government rather than
a private party is driving the tort action, we are more likely to suspect that broad suppression of
valuable speech is afoot.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-2\DPL212.txt unknown Seq: 34 21-APR-20 12:04
528 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:495
ancing approaches. Rather, I merely argue that the Court should rec-
ognize—and take full advantage of—the comparative flexibility it has
in crafting speech-tort doctrine as compared to traditional speech
doctrine.
As I hope the discussion below makes clear, speech-tort cases are
complex, raising varying degrees of constitutional concern based on a
wide range of circumstances. But the unique nature of the speech-tort
context allows for a more meaningful degree of segmentation, catego-
rization, and contextualization within the doctrine—an approach that
runs directly counter to both the Court’s recent efforts to limit such
segmentation in traditional First Amendment doctrine143 and its
broad approach in Snyder.144 In some of these discrete circumstances,
rule-like approaches may make sense; in others, more open-ended
tests may be a better fit. But my core argument here is that the Court
should embrace the full range of doctrinal tools it has at its disposal to
account for the complexity and variety of speech-tort cases, rather
than adopt the broad, rigid, one-size-fits-all posture emblematic of its
approach to traditional First Amendment cases.
1. Stringency of Established Doctrinal Standards
The realm of tort law covers a wide range of claims, each of which
implicates a distinct legally protected interest, and each of which is
constructed with varying degrees of stringency to establish liability. A
defamation claim is vastly different from an IIED claim, a products
liability claim, a right of publicity claim, or a claim for intentional in-
terference with prospective economic relations, and each potentially
encroaches upon First Amendment principles in a distinct manner.
As discussed above, although the Court’s speech-tort jurisprudence
is relatively sparse, it has evinced a tendency—shared by the lower
courts—to simply extend aspects of its defamation framework to
other tort contexts. It extended the Sullivan approach to false light
privacy claims in Hill and to certain types of IIED claims in Falwell,
while lower courts extended it to right of publicity and tortious inter-
ference claims.145 And in Snyder—an IIED case that, unlike Falwell,
fell well outside of the defamation context—the Court continued to
adhere to the same broad assumptions it had adopted in the defama-
tion context: It characterized the application of tort law as direct gov-
ernment regulation to be evaluated in the typical First Amendment
143. See supra text accompanying notes 67–69. R
144. See supra Section II.A.
145. See id.
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posture of deep suspicion of government abuse.146 It therefore
adopted the same broad, categorical approach in the IIED context,
strongly implying that IIED liability simply cannot lie when the alleg-
edly tortious act in question is speech on a matter of public concern.147
Different tort claims, however, vary substantially as to the ease by
which they may be established under prevailing doctrine, raising dis-
tinct risks that may call for distinct doctrinal treatment. Under the
common law, the bar for establishing a libel claim was very low: in
many jurisdictions (like Alabama), the plaintiff need only prove a de-
famatory statement, that the statement was of and concerning the
plaintiff, and that it was communicated to at least one person besides
the defamed party.148 Furthermore, “the plaintiff could recover with-
out proof of any fault by the defendant, without any proof that the
publication was false, and without any proof of actual damages.”149 As
such, the Court’s aggressively categorical and highly prophylactic ap-
proach in crafting a constitutional corrective in Sullivan made sense,
given the significant risk of substantial chilling effects and government
abuse associated with the highly permissive common law standards.
But as Justice Samuel Alito highlighted in his Snyder dissent, IIED
is fundamentally different—it is “a narrow tort with requirements that
‘are rigorous, and difficult to satisfy.’”150 Unlike common law defama-
tion, IIED requires either intent to inflict severe emotional distress or
recklessness on the part of the defendant.151 The conduct must be “ex-
treme and outrageous”—an element that has been strictly construed,
as indicated by the oft-quoted Restatement characterization of it as
conduct “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to
go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atro-
cious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”152 And the
146. See id.
147. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (“Given that Westboro’s speech was at a
public place on a matter of public concern, that speech is entitled to ‘special protection’ under
the First Amendment. Such speech cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses
contempt.”).
148. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 262 (1964); DOBBS, supra note 74, § 401, at
1120 (listing the traditional common law elements of libel).
149. DOBBS, supra note 74, at 1120.
150. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 464 (Alito, J., dissenting).
151. Zipursky, supra note 73, at 504–05 (“Those who wish to avoid liability have complete
control over that decision; the intentionality requirement helps to ensure that we do not have
accidental liability here, but only liability where someone has deliberately chosen to behave in a
way that they know will inflict serious injury upon others.”).
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
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plaintiff must suffer severe emotional distress, a standard that has sim-
ilarly been construed strictly by courts.153
As Zipursky has observed, the apparently open-textured nature of
the outrageousness requirement belies its actual role and develop-
ment through common law decision-making. The outrageousness de-
termination “is, in effect, a decision narrowing [IIED] liability in a
special way: by insulating defendants from liability except in the case
where the most basic familiarity with social norms and conventions
would lead everyone to recognize that the conduct was well beyond
the bounds of decency.”154 And as Zipursky notes, IIED, as it has
developed under the common law, can be described as “a family of
torts” coalescing around certain discrete factual contexts155 that are
“loosely captured through the notion of outrageous conduct . . . .”156
As such, the comparatively rigorous standards of IIED—as com-
pared to the low bar set by common law libel—ought to temper, at
least to some extent, any associated fears of government abuse. If only
few, truly exceptional cases will meet the requisite IIED standards,
the concern that IIED liability can be used as an effective instrument
for government suppression of speech is correspondingly diminished.
This observation, however, comes with an important caveat. Even if
one accepts the premise that IIED doctrine is currently construed in a
narrow manner that limits the risk of government abuse, there is no
guarantee that this construction will necessarily persist. While the
common law nature of tort doctrine can provide some degree of struc-
ture and constraint to standards that might seem indeterminate on
their face, it also provides the flexibility and open-endedness that al-
lows courts to depart—sometimes rapidly—from their previous path.
And this sort of discretion is of special concern in the speech context,
where, as Vincent Blasi has noted, courts often face intense
majoritarian pressures, particularly in those “pathological” times, like
wartime, “when intolerance of unorthodox ideas is most prevalent and
153. See, e.g., Russo v. White, 400 S.E.2d 160, 161, 163 (Va. 1991) (finding no severe emotional
distress where plaintiff, as a result of receiving 340 “hang up” calls from defendant over a two
month span, “alleged that she was nervous, could not sleep, experienced stress and ‘its physical
symptoms,’ withdrew from activities, and was unable to concentrate at work”).
154. Zipursky, supra note 73, at 504.
155. As Zipursky notes, these “clusters of cases” include “striking effrontery in dealing with
passengers or guests, vicious practical jokes, gross sexual misconduct and/or stalking, and mis-
handling of the deaths, funerals, or corpses of family members.” Id. at 502.
156. Id. at 503; see also Catherine M. Sharkey, The Vicissitudes of Tort: A Response to Profes-
sors Rabin, Sebok & Zipursky, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 695, 711–12 (2011) (observing that “[g]iven
the internal policing of the [IIED] tort” through the institution of “sharp restrictions” limiting
the “subjective, open-ended standard for liability,” “the need for external limitations imposed by
the U.S. Supreme Court may be correspondingly limited”).
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when governments are most able and most likely to stifle dissent
systematically.”157
To say that the common law has construed outrageousness in the
IIED context to be a highly stringent standard thus doesn’t necessarily
guarantee that courts—particularly in times of pathological stress—
will adhere to such a standard. But the inertia rooted in the broad
body of preexisting common law limitations nevertheless tempers the
risk of undue chilling effects on speech and the likelihood of govern-
ment abuse, as it generally reflects a tort context where—as compared
to the defamation context—speech values have been less often and
less substantially endangered given the stringency of the standards
imposed.
2. Variety of Different Tort Contexts
The extent to which we might suspect government mischief in a
speech-tort case also rests upon the nature of the particular tort claim
in question. Some torts focus on dignitary harms, such as defamation
or IIED; some on physical harms, such as negligence; and still others
on economic harms, such as intentional interference with contractual
relations or right of publicity. And the allegedly tortious speech in
question might produce harm through the communication of facts
(whether true or false),158 through the appropriation of another per-
son’s name or likeness,159 or by encouraging the listener to commit a
harmful act.160 The exact degree to which each of these differences
should matter in crafting speech-tort doctrine is beyond the scope of
this Article, but it is clear that at least some of these differences
should matter, and that speech-tort jurisprudence cannot be viewed as
a largely apples-to-apples endeavor across tort contexts.
Indeed, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard,161 the Court explicitly rec-
ognized the importance of distinguishing between fundamentally dif-
ferent speech-tort contexts. In Zacchini, the Court confronted a case
in which a television station recorded the entirety of Hugo Zacchini’s
157. Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
449, 449–50 (1985).
158. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) (public disclosure of private
facts).
159. See id. § 652C.
160. See, e.g., Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975) (affirming finding of negli-
gence liability against defendant radio station for a fatal accident caused by the station’s promo-
tion awarding money to listeners who were the first to physically locate the station’s vehicle, the
location of which was continuously teased by the station’s DJ).
161. 433 U.S. 562.
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“human cannonball” act and aired it in on the local news.162 Zacchini
sued the TV station, arguing that it violated his “right to the publicity
value of his performance.”163 The Ohio Supreme Court—relying
heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Hill, a false light case—
held that the TV station’s actions were protected under the First
Amendment because it was broadcasting “matters of public
interest.”164
The Supreme Court, however, observed that a right of publicity
claim is “entirely different” from the false light claim in Hill.165 It
noted that “[t]he interest protected in permitting recovery” in a false
light case “is clearly that of reputation, with the same overtones of
mental distress as in defamation”; by contrast, “the State’s interest in
permitting a ‘right of publicity’ is in protecting the proprietary interest
of the individual in his act in part to encourage such entertain-
ment.”166 It also noted that “[i]n ‘false light’ cases the only way to
protect the interests involved is to attempt to minimize publication of
the damaging matter, while in ‘right of publicity’ cases the only ques-
tion is who gets to do the publishing.”167 The nub of a right of public-
ity claim isn’t the fact that the material was published widely, thereby
inflicting dignitary harm on the plaintiff; rather, it’s that the plaintiff
did not receive the commercial benefits of the publication.168 The
Court therefore held that the imposition of tort liability would not
violate the First Amendment, despite the fact that the broadcast
speech was clearly of public interest.169 And this makes sense: There is
less of a concern with government abuse if the core of the claim is “I
didn’t get paid” as opposed to “That speech inflicted dignitary harm.”
Although the Zacchini Court clearly recognized that a distinct tort
context required the establishment of distinct constitutional bounda-
ries, Snyder suggests that the current Court may not be particularly
sensitive to these sorts of distinctions, at least in less extreme cases.170
Rather, as discussed above, it suggests that the Court’s approach to
speech-tort cases outside of the defamation context will be strongly
influenced by the gravitational pull of its defamation jurisprudence.
162. Id. at 563–64.
163. Id. at 565.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 571.
166. Id. at 573.
167. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573.
168. Id. at 573–74; see also id. at 578 (“Petitioner does not seek to enjoin the broadcast of his
performance; he simply wants to be paid for it.”).
169. Id. at 578–79.
170. See supra Section II.A.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-2\DPL212.txt unknown Seq: 39 21-APR-20 12:04
2020] SPEECH TORTS AND THE CONSTITUTION 533
3. The Role of the Government
As Oman and Solomon observed, the degree of direct and discrete
government involvement also clearly influences the extent to which
we ought to suspect government mischief in a speech-tort case.171 As
Sullivan made clear, greater constitutional concerns arise in cases
where the government or a public official is the plaintiff in the suit.
When the government—or someone closely associated with the gov-
ernment—initiates the suit in a speech-tort case, it starts to resemble a
traditional First Amendment context involving direct regulation. And
when the government has this sort of direct control over litigating the
civil action in question, the potential for abuse is greatly multiplied
and more aggressive constitutional intervention may be justified.172
Similarly, more concerns might be present when the source of the
substantive law is a targeted statute rather than an application of
broad common law standards. A targeted statute ties liability directly
to legislative action, which, as discussed above, raises greater concerns
regarding government abuse than purely judicial action.173 It also
evinces the sort of clear regulatory intent that is absent in a run-of-
the-mill common law case. Finally, it indicates an increased degree of
government control over private actions, as the legislature is affirma-
tively acting to encourage private parties to bring lawsuits against par-
ticular types of speech or particular parties.174
4. The Nature of the Speech
As discussed above, the Snyder Court’s analysis seemed to broadly
preclude tort liability in cases where the speech in question is on a
matter of public concern.175 Although I disagree with the categorical
nature of the Court’s approach, whether the speech in question is on a
public or private concern is certainly relevant in evaluating the likeli-
hood of government abuse and the severity of any associated chilling
171. See Oman & Solomon, supra note 29, at 1165 (arguing that “the extent to which the state
is involved in the litigation has implications for the extent to which constitutional rights are at
stake”).
172. See id. (“If the state involvement consists of making available a common-law action and
enforcing a jury verdict, then the constitutional concerns should be less significant than those
raised in litigation involving a state statute, agency action, or direct action by government
officials.”).
173. See id. (observing that because a statute “comes from legislators who have to face voters
every few years, we ought to be suspicious of the governmental motive or purpose . . . , more so
than we need to be in the . . . posture of Snyder”).
174. For similar reasons, greater concern might also be present when the government is other-
wise formally involved in the litigation as an advocate (for example, in cases where it has filed an
amicus brief in support of tort liability). See id. at 1164.
175. See supra Section II.A.
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effects, as the Court recognized in both Snyder and its defamation ju-
risprudence.176 Speech on matters of public concern—such as political
speech and other ideological speech—resides at the very core of First
Amendment protection, and it is, by its very nature, the type of speech
most likely to be targeted by a government seeking to manipulate the
marketplace of ideas for its own ends.177 Premising tort liability on
this category of speech therefore poses comparatively greater risks of
government abuse.
5. Case-Specific Indicia of Animus or Bias
Finally, on a more granular, case-specific level, certain qualities of
the facts or the way in which the case was decided might raise a
heightened suspicion of mischief on the part of the judge or jury in a
particular speech-tort case. That is, certain circumstantial factors
might suggest that the imposition of tort liability in the case was moti-
vated primarily by a desire to suppress the viewpoint of the speech in
question, which may influence the reviewing court’s decision to inter-
vene on constitutional grounds.
This suspicion of animus or bias in the present case—whether or not
it is explicitly recognized in the reviewing court’s analysis—might
highlight the broad risk of abuse inherent to the doctrinal structure
and approach adopted by the state court, leading reviewing courts to
be more aggressive in instituting constitutional boundaries. Of course,
divining the motives of judges or the jury in a particular speech-tort
case is a fraught endeavor (as it is highly unlikely that any animus or
bias would be directly expressed), and perhaps reviewing courts
should be cautious in presuming bad motives on the part of judicial
actors. Nevertheless, circumstances may arise that provide some basis
for a heightened suspicion of abuse, particularly in cases where multi-
ple factors converge.
One indicia may be the extent to which the liability judgment seems
to represent a substantial stretch or departure from preexisting com-
mon law boundaries and principles. This may not be an easy judgment
to make in practice—after all, tort law evolves through common law
development, and it is squarely in the prerogative of state courts to
adjust and modify the doctrine as novel factual circumstances arise.
Nevertheless, significant departures from existing doctrine might re-
176. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757–61 (1985)
(plurality opinion).
177. See id. Cf. William P. Marshall, False Campaign Speech and the First Amendment, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 285, 298–99 (2004) (“[P]roscribing false political speech is constitutionally problem-
atic because it empowers the government to decide what is true and false in politics.”).
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present a basis for doubting the court’s motives. If, for example, the
application of the “outrageousness” standard appears to be unusually
watered down in an IIED case, or an unusually relaxed standard of
proximate cause is applied in a speech-related negligence case, or
speech that appears to be particularly harmless is deemed “improper”
in an intentional interference with contractual relations case, then this
might create suspicion that animus—rather than the neutral applica-
tion of established tort principles—is driving the result.
Other indicia may include the extent to which the speech in ques-
tion involves a heated and controversial issue of public concern and
the extent to which the damages award appears to be grossly dispro-
portionate to the harm suffered. None of these factors, standing alone,
may be sufficient to suspect any sort of impermissible bias or animus
on the part of the judge or jury. But if they all were to converge in a
Sullivan-like case178—if, for example, a grossly disproportionate liabil-
ity judgment is awarded in a case dealing with a heated issue of public
concern, in a manner that represents a substantial stretch from ex-
isting common law doctrine—a heightened suspicion of government
abuse based on presumed animus may well be justified.179
B. Revisiting Snyder
The wide range of different factual and doctrinal factors that influ-
ence speech-tort analyses, as described above, illustrate the broad
value of adopting more contextualized, segmented, and open-ended
approaches to such cases. The rigid, rule-like, one-size-fits-all ap-
proach typically favored in the First Amendment context is a poor fit
for the sprawling and complex domain of speech-tort doctrine, where
the decision of where to draw First Amendment boundaries—and
what sorts of boundaries should be drawn—is effectively rooted in a
broad intuitional judgment, premised on a wide range of factors, re-
garding the risk of government mischief in each particular case and
speech-tort context.
178. See Oman & Solomon, supra note 29, at 1131 (observing that “[g]iven the context of
Sullivan, it is unsurprising that the Court saw the libel action at issue in the case primarily in
terms of the state’s effort to suppress critical speech”). Oman and Solomon note that “the case
arose in the context of the largely unsuccessful attempt by the federal courts to force southern
states to desegregate”; the “tenuous” connection between the advertisement and Sullivan; and
the fact that the criticism from the New York Times ad “likely enhanced—rather than libeled—
Sullivan’s political reputation.” Id.
179. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 294 (1964) (Black, J., concurring) (describing
the “widespread hostility to de-segregation” manifested in Montgomery—particularly against
“outside agitators”—and observing that the facts of the case “suggest[ ] that these feelings of
hostility had at least as much to do with rendition of this half-million-dollar verdict as did an
appraisal of damages”).
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And as discussed above, the unique posture of the speech-tort con-
text gives the Court more flexibility to undertake these sorts of ap-
proaches. Although the chilling effects and risks of government abuse
that arise in speech-tort cases raise constitutional concerns, there are
strong reasons to regard these concerns as comparatively less severe
than those arising from a direct regulation context. There is therefore
less of a need to adopt the same uncompromising posture of extreme
suspicion of all government action that is emblematic of First Amend-
ment doctrine, and thus less of a need to adhere strictly to simple,
rigid, and categorical rules.
Again, this is not to say that the Court should therefore institute
highly discretionary First Amendment standards across the board. It is
to say, however, that the Court should embrace greater contextualiza-
tion in its approaches. In particular factual and doctrinal contexts—
like those involved in Sullivan—concerns regarding government abuse
may be at their apex, such that adopting rigid and highly prophylactic
approaches makes eminent sense. But many other contexts—where
such concerns are comparatively muted—are better suited for more
modest, open-ended approaches that can more closely track the wide
range of factual and doctrinal factors that drive the analysis.
To illustrate what this all might look like in practice, let’s revisit
Snyder v. Phelps. As discussed above, the Court’s analysis rested en-
tirely on its determination that the speech in question was speech on a
matter of public concern (and thus carried significant constitutional
value) and that the protestors were located at a place they were le-
gally allowed to be.180 And although the Court half-heartedly at-
tempted to narrow its holding to the specific facts of the case, lower
courts have reasonably read the Court’s broad language as establish-
ing a broad rule that tort liability cannot be imposed with respect to
speech on a matter of public concern.181
The Snyder Court adhered to a highly speech-inflected approach.182
Most notably, it leaned heavily on the content-based nature of the
IIED claim.183 As the Court observed, “A group of parishioners
standing at the very spot where Westboro stood, holding signs that
said ‘God Bless America’ and ‘God Loves You,’ would not have been
subjected to liability.”184 The fact that IIED liability in Snyder “turned
on the content and viewpoint of the message conveyed, rather than
180. See supra Section II.A.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 457 (2011).
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any interference with the funeral itself,” played a significant role in
the Court’s analysis.185 This is of course a direct reflection of tradi-
tional First Amendment doctrine, in which all content-based regula-
tions of speech—save a few narrow exceptions—are evaluated under
an onerous strict scrutiny standard, and viewpoint-based distinctions
are singled out as particularly problematic.
This cornerstone First Amendment rule, however, is the product of
the extreme suspicion of government abuse that is fundamental to
First Amendment doctrine. As then-Professor Elena Kagan noted, the
rule works to “ferret[ ] out impermissible governmental motives” in
speech cases; as she observed, “[w]e presume that content-based regu-
lation will exacerbate rather than minimize existing bias because we
believe that such regulation is disproportionately linked to suspect
motives.”186 As such, the Court crafted a blunt, highly prophylactic
rule, which reflected the strong First Amendment presumption that
the administrability and predictability benefits of such a rigid ap-
proach outweigh the costs associated with the rule’s lack of precision
and flexibility within the wide range of different speech contexts.187
The application of IIED to the speech in Snyder was certainly con-
tent-based (and viewpoint-based). Indeed, this is an integral aspect of
any speech-based IIED claim: We cannot know if speech is “outra-
geous”—that is, “atrocious” and “utterly intolerable in a civilized soci-
ety”—without knowing exactly what is said. To be sure, the essence of
an IIED claim is not that the speech communicates a viewpoint that is
unpopular or despicable (although this might be true in particular
cases)—rather, it is that the speech, in the particular context in which
it was made, fell outside of the broadest possible reaches of acceptable
public behavior.188 But if viewed purely through the First Amendment
lens, this is irrelevant—given that outrageousness “is a highly mallea-
185. Id.
186. See Kagan, supra note 48, at 414, 450; see also David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophy-
lactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 200 (1989) (“A content-based measure is viewed with suspi-
cion because it is too likely to have been influenced by the legislature’s hostility to the speech in
question.”).
187. See Strauss, supra note 186, at 200 (“[I]f a court is permitted to balance the benefits of a
content-based measure against its costs, it is too likely that the court will be influenced by its
own reaction to the point of view expressed; that is why the Supreme Court uses relatively rigid
categories instead of balancing in each case.”).
188. As Zipursky put it, IIED covers those cases “where the most basic familiarity with social
norms and conventions would lead everyone to recognize that the conduct was well beyond the
bounds of decency.” Zipursky, supra note 73, at 504. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law
for the First Amendment, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 39 (2018) (“If there had been some
direct abusive conduct [in Snyder], I am hard pressed to think that the conduct should be pro-
tected from tort liability because the abuse related to the war in Iraq as opposed to the dece-
dent’s bad posture.”).
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ble standard with an inherent subjectiveness about it which would al-
low a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or
views,”189 we presume that IIED liability will be leveraged by the gov-
ernment (represented by majoritarian juries) to silence unpopular
speech.
But for the reasons stated above, this presumption should not apply
with equal force in all speech-tort cases, and the Court erred in sug-
gesting that the content-based nature of IIED categorically dooms its
application to any speech on a matter of public concern. In a common-
law IIED case between completely private parties, the fact that the
speech was on a matter of public concern alone should not have been
fatal, given the lack of direct government control over the initiation
and management of the case, the institutional role of the court as sole
state actor, and the hybrid state/private nature of any chilling effects
raised in the case. Whether the speech in question was on a matter of
public concern is certainly relevant to the ultimate determination, as
this would heighten the concerns with chilling effects and the risk of
government abuse associated with the speech-tort context. But in a
case like Snyder, these concerns are not so severe as to dictate that the
analysis ought to categorically end there.
Rather, the Court should have undertaken a more open-ended and
contextualized analysis, focusing on whether—under all of the circum-
stances surrounding the particular claim in question—there is strong
reason to be wary of actual or potential government mischief. On this
basis, one could certainly argue that the Court erred in striking down
the liability judgment in Snyder. As an initial matter, Snyder was a
common-law tort suit initiated by a purely private party, in which the
only state action was the court’s adjudication of the case. Further-
more, as Zipursky noted, the facts of the case fell neatly into one of
the long-established factual contexts in which IIED liability had tradi-
tionally arisen—the “mishandling of the deaths, funerals, or corpses of
family members.”190 There is therefore no strong indication that the
unpopular viewpoint of the speech in some way stretched or distorted
the court’s application of IIED doctrine. Given the facts and posture
of the case and the doctrinal backdrop, there is no strong indication
that Maryland courts would have treated, for example, funeral protes-
ters holding signs reading “God Hates Nazis” at a white supremacist’s
funeral any differently than the defendants in Snyder. Thus, accepting
the Court’s categorization of the speech as that on a matter of public
189. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 458.
190. Zipursky, supra note 73, at 502.
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concern, the Court could nevertheless conclude, under this more
open-ended analysis, that the risks of government abuse and imper-
missible chilling effects in the case do not outweigh the state’s inter-
ests in imposing tort liability.
My ultimate quarrel here, however, is not with the result that the
Snyder Court reached, but rather with the manner by which the Court
reached it. As Justice Stephen Breyer noted in his concurrence, the
Court could have reasonably reached the same result by undertaking
a more modest, contextual approach.191
An oft-overlooked fact of the case is that the protest was located
1,000 feet from the church and “could not be seen or heard from the
funeral ceremony itself”;192 Snyder himself only “saw the tops of the
picketers’ signs when driving to the funeral, but did not learn what
was written on the signs until watching a news broadcast later that
night.”193 These facts might suggest that the finding of outrageousness
was more of a stretch than might otherwise be expected.194 Further-
more, the jury awarded Snyder $2.9 million in compensatory dam-
ages—an incredibly high and perhaps excessive amount, even with
respect to the significant anguish Snyder undoubtedly felt.195 As Eu-
gene Volokh observed, an award of this magnitude might “reflect the
jury’s contempt for the Phelpsians’ viewpoint.”196 All of these facts—
viewed in combination with the nature and location of the speech—
might indicate the significant potential for government abuse through
the targeting of unpopular speech. Or perhaps—to use Justice
Breyer’s purely instrumental framing of the issue—“[t]o uphold the
application of state law in these circumstances would punish Westboro
for seeking to communicate its views on matters of public concern
without proportionately advancing the State’s interest in protecting its
citizens against severe emotional harm.”197
191. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 462 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 449.
194. See Epstein, supra note 188, at 38 (arguing that “so long as there is no direct interaction
between the defendant and plaintiff [the IIED] claim would fail, for the supposed impact is no
greater than if the demonstration were done 100 miles away”).
195. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Dis-
tress Tort, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 300, 308 (“[E]ven a grieving father likely wouldn’t
be damaged to the tune of $2.9 million by speech (1) that he saw once (albeit on a very emotion-
ally significant day), not before or during the funeral but later in the day, on television, (2) that
he knew was not remotely reflective of the views of his community, and (3) that he knew was
said by people who are held in contempt by the community.”).
196. Id. at 309.
197. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 462–63 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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Either way, Justice Breyer’s broad conceptualization of this particu-
lar speech-tort context—as one requiring a more open-ended, contex-
tualized review of “the underlying facts in detail,” beyond the nature
of the speech in question198—strikes me as correct. A lawsuit between
two purely private parties for IIED—a tort with far more stringent
requirements than defamation—is not the sort of situation that auto-
matically justifies the extreme suspicion of government abuse typical
of a traditional First Amendment case, even if it involves speech on a
matter of public concern. To reflexively deem IIED liability unconsti-
tutional under these circumstances is to adopt an approach that is ex-
cessively prophylactic given the unique, hybrid nature of speech-tort
cases. The speech-tort context gives the Court more precise tools to
manage this sort of case, and the Court should use them.
CONCLUSION
Courts should evince a greater willingness to embrace more open-
ended, contextualized approaches in speech-tort jurisprudence. They
provide courts with greater flexibility to tailor constitutional bounda-
ries to a wide range of different factual and doctrinal contexts, and the
idiosyncratic nature of speech-tort cases gives courts greater latitude
to adopt such approaches while according sufficient deference to fun-
damental First Amendment values. As such, they fit the complex and
unique characteristics of speech-tort jurisprudence—an unruly colli-
sion of two diametrically opposed legal cultures that covers a wide,
intricate, and eclectic range of civil liability.
These sorts of approaches would also be beneficial in promoting the
thoughtful crafting of speech-tort doctrine through common-law
processes. They yield decisions that will generally be more modest in
scope, as they will be premised not on far-reaching categorical rules,
but on more case- and context-specific, multi-factored analyses. This
sort of incremental approach to crafting doctrine gives courts the
space and time to account for the particular challenges raised in dis-
crete speech-tort contexts. Courts need not feel the pressure—charac-
teristic of the First Amendment context—to develop clear,
categorical, and administrable rules that account for a broad range of
cases and establish clear guidance to potential litigants. Rather, they
can proceed more modestly and cautiously; and as they confront more
and more speech-tort cases, they might, over time, be able to concre-
tize, organize, and unify speech-tort doctrine in a more systematic
manner. This more incremental, contextualized approach thus gives
198. Id. at 462.
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courts a greater capacity to develop both constitutional doctrine and
tort doctrine in a more deliberate and thoughtful manner, rather than
adopt categorical approaches that may prove to be unwise with the
benefit of hindsight.
Furthermore, as an institutional matter, adopting these sorts of
open-ended and incremental approaches gives more freedom to state
courts to experiment with different ways to doctrinally balance speech
interests and tort interests.199 State courts have, in many different con-
texts, taken it upon themselves to balance these interests in crafting
the contours of state tort law:200 for example, declining to recognize
products liability claims based on the contents of reference books201
or declining to recognize the tort of public disclosure of private
facts.202 Indeed, the common law tort of fraud is broadly understood
to raise no constitutional issues—not because imposing liability for
false speech can never pose First Amendment problems,203 but rather
because common law courts have designed it in a manner that is suffi-
ciently protective of First Amendment interests.204
Thus, embracing more contextualized and open-ended approaches
to speech-tort cases produces an iterative process of cooperative com-
mon law decision-making between federal and state courts and be-
tween constitutional doctrine and state tort doctrine.205 While state
courts shape the internal boundaries of state tort law to account for
free speech principles, both federal and state courts are shaping the
First Amendment boundaries of tort doctrine. On both fronts, the
199. See Anderson, supra note 55, at 811 (“Ideally the Court should not decide how tort law
should be modified to achieve the right level of protection. That should be left to the state
courts. It is a question to which there is unlikely to be a single right answer, and which therefore
is likely to benefit from the experimentalism of the common law and federalism.”).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 12–17 (describing state courts’ balancing of speech R
and tort interests within common law defamation doctrine pre-Sullivan). But see Anderson,
supra note 55, at 818 (“The Court’s perceived hegemony in free speech matters seems to have a
paralyzing effect on state courts. . . . Even when the Court implicitly invites alternative solutions,
the state courts have not responded vigorously.”).
201. See, e.g., Birmingham v. Fodor’s Travel Publ’ns, Inc., 833 P.2d 70 (Haw. 1992); Alm v.
Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 1263, 1267 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (“Even if liability
could be imposed consistently with the Constitution, we believe that the adverse effect of such
liability upon the public’s free access to ideas would be too high a price to pay.”).
202. See, e.g., Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711, 717 (N.C. 1988).
203. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 716–22 (2012) (plurality opinion) (holding
that some false statements of fact are constitutionally protected).
204. See Han, supra note 9, at 1143–44 (“One could imagine a different design of the fraud
tort that might infringe on First Amendment interests such that doctrinal modification would be
necessary (if, for example, falsity of the statement were presumed based on a mere showing of
reliance and damages).”).
205. For a more detailed account of this interaction within the speech-tort context, see
Gordon, supra note 17, at 49–51 (describing the benefits of “cooperative judicial federalism”).
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courts proceed cautiously and incrementally, through the organic pro-
cess of common law development. They therefore not only have the
time and space to thoughtfully consider the varied complexities of dif-
ferent speech-tort contexts as they arise, but they also have the oppor-
tunity to communicate, react, and respond to each other, creating the
sort of trans-substantive dialogue and dialectical give-and-take that is
particularly valuable in crafting sound doctrine. As Gordon observed,
speech-tort cases “present real opportunities for state and federal
courts to engage in productive dialogue, to respond to each other’s
opinions, and to shape the contours of their own (and each other’s)
law, ensuring state law compliance with federal commands.”206
As detailed above, speech-tort jurisprudence is idiosyncratic, com-
plicated, and potentially wide-ranging in its reach. Thus, in crafting
speech-tort doctrine, courts should embrace an approach that forth-
rightly accounts for this complexity and eclecticism and leverages the
collective capacities of both common law courts and constitutional
courts to locate—through dialogue, debate, and incremental doctrine-
building—the most sensible boundaries between tort liability and the
First Amendment’s protection of free speech.
206. Id. at 50.
